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Primer on Voting Rules |
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The best voting rules are inclusive, well centered, and decisive.
The results can make a group more popular, stable and quick. |
| The tools get stronger from one voting task to the next: | ||
![]() | Introduction | Tragedies of democracy: What's wrong? |
| Eras in Voting | Voting Progress: 19th Century, 20th Century, 21st Century. | |
![]() | A Small Example | Nine voters: Line up to vote, Plurality, Runoff, Two issues. |
![]() | Chief Executive | Instant Runoff Voting: Principle, Merits, Patterns. |
| Council Elections | Proportional Representation: Principle, Merits, Patterns. | |
![]() | Funding Choices | Fair-share Spending: Old Problems, Principle, Merits. New |
![]() | Policy Decision | Condorcet & Rules of Order: Principle, Merits, Patterns. |
Philosophy.
Conclusions.
Prints.
Next Slide ↓
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After this primer shows the need for better voting rules, the voting workshop will show the simple steps in each tally. (A pdf version has both plus pictures from PoliticalSim™.) Then download free software to tally votes. |
Introduction | ||
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Tragedies of Democracy
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Our defective voting rules come from the
failure to see there are different jobs for voting;
and these require different types of voting.
We all know how to decide the simplest sort of issue: A question with only two answers must be answered yes or no. For such an issue, the “yes” and “no” votes are enough. But as soon as three candidates run for one office, the situation becomes more complicated. Then a yes-no vote is no longer suitable. Sometimes we do not want to elect just one official. We want a whole council to represent all the voters. For this we do not need a system that divides voters into winners and losers. What we need is a way of condensing them, in the right proportions, into their chosen leaders. |
Eras in Democracy | ||
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The 1800s: Winner-Take-All Districts lead to Off-Center Councils
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1900s: Fair-Share Representation leads to Off-Center Majorities
Typical Council Elected By Proportional Representation | ||
2000s: Ensemble Councils lead to Broad, Centered Majorities
$ Ensemble Elected By Central And Proportional Rules | ||
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A Small Example | ||
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Nine Voters
High taxes, great gov. services Jump to the next slide by clicking the gray link. Plurality ↓ | ||
Plurality Election
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Runoff Election
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Politics in Two Issue Dimensions
Kay wins a plurality. |
Chief Executive | ||
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The Goal of Instant Runoff Voting is this:A majority winner
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How does it work? You rank your favorite candidates,
as your first choice, second choice, third and so on. Then your ballot goes to your first-rank candidate. If no candidate gets a majority, the one with the fewest
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In South Korea's 1987 presidential election, two
progressives faced the aide to a military dictator.
The progressives got a majority of the votes but split
their supporters. So the conservative won under
a plurality vote-counting rule. These rules elect
whoever gets the most votes; 50% is not required.
The winner claimed a mandate to continue repressive policies. Years later he was convicted of treason in the tragic killing of pro-democracy demonstrators. With Instant Runoff Voting, ballots for the weaker progressive could have transferred to help elect the stronger one. The US also has seen major elections in which two candidates on the left split their voters or two on the right split theirs. Sometimes this increased our national tragedies. (Can you name some of these split elections and their tragic results?) |
From five factions to one majority.

| IRV elects leaders in cities large and small: London, Sidney, San Francisco, Burlington, Dublin and others. Students use it at Duke, Harvard, Stanford, Rice, Tufts, MIT, Cal Tech, Carlton, Clark, Cornell, Dartmouth, Hendrix, Reed, UCLA, Vassar, Whitman, William and Mary, The University of: Cal, Il, Md, Mn, Ok, Va, Wa, Wi, and more. | A picture in the transferable vote workshop shows individual ballots moving.
IRV lets you vote for the candidate you really like. And even if that option loses, your vote isn't wasted; it goes to your next choice. |
Council Elections | ||||
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The principle of Full Representation is this:Majority rule,
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That is, 60% of the vote gets you 60% of the seats,
not all of them. And 10% of the vote gets you 10%
of the seats, not none of them. These are fair shares.
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| Chicago now elects no Republicans to the State Congress, even though they win up to a third of its votes. But for over a century Chicago elected reps from both parties. The state used a fair rule to elect three reps in each district. Most districts gave the majority party two reps and the minority party one. | Those Chicago Republicans were usually moderates. So were Democratic reps from Republican strongholds. Even the biggest party in a district tended to elect reps who were more independent. They could work together and make state policies more moderate. |
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New Zealand switched in 1996 from Single-Winner
Districts to a blend of SWD and Full Representation.
A one-winner district exaggerates local issues and alliances.
Full Rep frees voters from district enclosures to
elect some reps with thin but widespread appeal.
The number of women elected rose from 21 to 35. The number of native Maoris elected rose from 6 to 15, which is almost proportional to the Maori population. Voters also elected 3 Polynesian reps and 1 Asian rep. Many people call this Full Representation or Proportional Voting. (The transferable vote workshop shows one way to get Full Representation.) |
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Ballot access laws make it hard for minor parties to get nominees on the ballot. The two big parties make those laws largely because they fear spoiler candidates. Better voting rules put that fear to rest.
A news firm may inform us better if votes by subscribers rule it. Public campaign funding, as in Maine and Arizona, lets reps spend less time with rich donors and more with common voters. (The Ackerman-Ayres plan gives each voter $50 of vouchers to donate. Anonymous giving means no political payback.) Optical-scan ballots and open-source software check fraud by election workers and corporations. Sabbatical terms make the current rep run against a former rep returning from sabbatical. Voters get a real choice between two winners. Each has a record of what they did in office. Plurality would tend to make the current and former reps both lose due to a party split. But IRV and Pairwise heal party splits. The sabbatical might pay a rep to do work in her district. Initiative voters get more choices and power with full-choice ballots and Pairwise tallies. They should set the political rules. But minority rights to ballots, reps and funds need constitutional protection from the majority of the day. |
Funding Choices | ||
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Fair Shares to Buy Public Goods
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The old way to set budgets blurs responsibility.
Take deficit spending. Progressives may say too much is spent on big weapons; conservatives
often blame the money spent on health and education.
Every rep can claim, “I didn't spend too much.”
Protecting the environment is popular with both conservative and progressive voters. Reps don't dare attack it openly. So, to pay off some corporate donors, reps slyly starve agencies that enforce environmental laws. Similar cuts have hit OHSA and the auditors of corporate tax returns. |
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“Lower but constant funding is more productive than a roller-coaster budget that
might average far more.”
The Texas Super-Conducting Super Collider was a multi-billion dollar project in the 1980s. This effort to build the world's largest cyclotron was supported by a majority in Congress for a few years... then dropped. The only thing built was a “billion-dollar hole in the ground.” Members might be more cautious about starting vast projects if they could not spend the opposition's share of the budget. And they should have the power to finish their projects with their own share. |
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Membership groups often shirk competitive elections
to avoid conflicts and hurt feelings. But members
still compete over money to fund projects.
Often, some members use tricks to capture a lot of the budget. When that injustice is felt, others may grow rebellious, or leave. They need a rule that makes spending fair.
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The US Congress lets a single rep “earmark” funds for pet projects in her district. In 1994, the four thousand earmarks cost us $23 billion. Ten years later, the fourteen thousand earmarks cost us $45 billion.
Earmarks help some reps give much more money to their districts than most reps do. Each rep votes yes or no to a huge “omnibus” bill. It holds hundreds of earmarks, some good, some bad. The system makes it hard to prove which reps are wasting money. |
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In a citywide vote, each neighborhood or interest
group funds a few school, park or road improvements.
The city's taxes then pay for the projects as the School,
Park, and Road Departments manage the contracts.
Every neighborhood and interest group controls its share of spending power; no one is shut out. This makes (hidden) empires less profitable.
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If a plurality spends all the money, the last thing they buy
adds little to their happiness. It is a low priority. But that
money could buy the high-priority favorite of a large minority;
making them happier.
In economic terms: The “social utility” of the money and goods tends to increase if we each allocate a share. Shares spread out opportunities and incentives too. In political terms: Fair shares earn wide respect, as we are each in some big minority funding a project. And our budget serves and appeals to more people. |
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That is, 60% of the voters spend 60% of the money,
not all of it. A project still needs grants from many
voters to prove it is a public good worth public money.
So we let a voter fund only a fraction of a project.
How does it work? Like IRV: You rank your choices. Then your money moves to help all the favorites you can afford.
And a tally of all ballots drops the least-funded project.
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Fair shares can set the budgets of departments too.
Every “line item” starts with most of its past budget. Voters write-in and rank higher budgets for the items. A voter's ballot can afford to pay its fair shares for many of its high ranks. Thus it gives them votes. Each budget level of an item is like a project:
One at a time, the weak ones lose and the money moves.
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The transferable vote workshop shows budget-setting math. |
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So if we all agree, we can change budgets radically.
But if many disagree, they can moderate the changes. Yet a minority cannot slow the budget process. Each agency starts with [80]% of its current budget.*
A minority can moderate a budget's change.
* To vote less than about [80]% to basic services, such as
BRV lets a majority reduce their grants to agency X. This undercuts a minority's grants to X. So, to maintain the total for X, the minority must give it bigger grants. Then the majority reduces theirs, etc. With BRV, nobody apportions the budget as they sincerely want it. In contrast, the previous fair-share rule gave all members positive power to fund favorites. |
Policy | ||
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Pairwise Test Number Two
K is nearest four voters. | ||
Pairwise Test Number Three
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Option M beats option K if most voters rank M above K.
Each ballot's rank of M compared to K concerns us.
Their numbers of first-rank votes do not. The winner must beat every rival, one-against-one. If another rule picks a different winner our “round-robin” tournament, or Condorcet winner ranks higher on most ballots, so she wins a one-against-one majority over that other rule's winner. |
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| A policy needs good marks from voters on all sides. That is because every rep can rank it compared to other policies. So all voters are “obtainable” and valuable. This leads to policies with wide appeal. (A plurality or runoff winner gets no help from the losing side and doesn't need to please those voters.) | The Pairwise winner is central and popular: Most centrist and progressive voters like it more than any conservative policy. At the same time, most centrist and conservative voters like it more than any progressive policy. All sides can join to beat narrowly-centrist policies. |
Everyone helps choose our center.
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Most progressive voters rank Kennedy [Livingstone, Lafontaine]
above Clinton [Blair, Schröder]. So to win a majority over
Kennedy, Clinton must outrank him on ballots from
centrists and conservatives. She cannot hope to be the first
choice for conservative voters; still, she must seek their favor.
Conservative voters rank Bush [Major, Kohl] higher than Clinton. So to win a majority over Bush, Clinton must appeal to centrists and progressives. | Every candidate needs the centrist voters, of course. But
every candidate needs the progressives and conservatives too.
When compared with Kennedy, Clinton needs those
conservative voters. And when compared with Bush,
Clinton needs the progressives.
In this Pairwise election of a moderator, a less controversial candidate might top each of these polarizing politicians. (A later page shows an interactive Pairwise tally table.) |
| Candidate M lost the last election by plurality rule. Now let's say her party gerrymanders the borders of her election district. They add neighbors (purple below) who tend to vote for her party; and exclude less favorable voters (the yellow voter missing on the left). So now her party is certain to win the new district. | Reps will tend to come from the party's activist wing.
The old plurality rule is the easiest to manipulate. But the Pairwise winner, L, doesn't change in this case. And Proportional Representation also resists gerrymanders. |
Now K has 3 votes.
L has two.
And M has four.
| Bribes, big campaign gifts, and jobs for friends
can make some reps switch sides on a policy.
Pairwise resists corruption well, as bribing a few reps
moves the council's middle, and the winning policy, only a little.
“Poison-pill amendments” are designed to make some reps change sides and oppose a bill they had supported. Pairwise lets reps rank the original bill, no bill, and the (poison) amended bill. They may shun the pill. Fair shares of seats and spending reduce the payoffs
to those who bribe the biggest party. It can no longer
seize more than its share of reps or money.
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Philosophy | |
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Meetings often make interlocking decisions one at a
time. They use a yes-no process, with or without explicit
rules of order, agendas, and votes. Items decided early can shut out later options.
Or people may talk about all options at once but never clearly tell (vote) their second and third choices. So a minority pushing a single idea can appear to be the strongest group. And one person with a balanced idea but no eager supporters might drop it. The best rules avoid all those problems by ranking the competing motions (or budgets) on the same ballot. (A ballot might ask the voter to score each distinct motion. The computer uses her scores to rank the large list of compatible combinations. Then the voter adjusts these ranks for the tally.) |
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Groups with little time and many issues or many
members and conflicting interests, usually follow
discussions with voting rather than consensus.
Voting can be anonymous to protect dissidents. It provides equality for busy or unassertive people. Pondering a ballot or survey educates members about setting budgets and priorities. A straw poll can find the major opinion groups and focus a discussion on the strongest idea from each group or on the most central options. Some issues allow decisions that are not adversarial or consensual: Multi-winner funding gives everyone a fair share of power. Yet it doesn't let anyone dictate or block action. |
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When choosing a voting rule, a new Mercedes costs
little more than an old jalopy. That price is a bargain
when the votes steer important budgets or policies.
Does your car have an 1890 steering tiller or a new, power steering wheel? Does your organization have an 1890 voting rule or a new, centered and balanced rule? Today's drivers need the skill to use power steering — but they don't need the math or logic to engineer it. Same with voters and voting rules. How to start? A group may test drive a new rule in a survey.
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Tools Between People
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Voting rules affect our laws — and our views on life.
By making us practice either winner-take-all or sharing, rules change the way we treat each other and see the world. Thus better voting rules can shift our expectations of voting and government. They can move from tools that inflame culture wars toward tools supporting diversity and its freedom. Happiness is strongly linked to good relationships. So a good way to increase happiness is to improve tools between people such as group-decision tools. |
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In the end, a group decision cannot satisfy two people with opposing values about the issue.
Migrating or “voting with your feet” is the surest way to get to the policies you want.
When you can't do that, avoid willful authoritarians;
build democratic institutions with open-minded egalitarians.
Democracy improves in eras such as The Enlightenment. Many people restrained blind faith, obedience and ideology. They worked to expand knowledge through rational, skeptical and empirical thinking. (There's more on the democratic philosophy page.) |
Conclusions | ||
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Give fair representation to all major groups.
So the council will enact laws with real majorities.
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These reforms open doors for popular changes. e.g.
Data shows Full Rep elects more women than plurality. And this change leads to better health and education. The data make it clear: advocates for education, health care, a clean environment and a clean government should all work for better voting rules. Donors should too. If we are overwhelmed by urgent needs, we neglect the essentials, the structural roots of these problems. We get bad public policies, due to bad representation, due to bad election laws. |
Issue campaigns lobby reps every week for years.
This eases one problem, but rarely fixes the source. Election campaigns cost a lot all at once. If you win control, you can help all issues for two years. Reform campaigns cost no more than elections.
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Learn more in this e-book, Accurate Democracy.
Then build support in your school, club or town with FairVote, The Center for Voting and Democracy. Steps toward accurate democracy include:
Accurate Democracy.com has simulation games and handouts plus free ballot-entry and tally software. |
| Booklet size | Grade | Primer | Workshop | Font | Paper |
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| Pocket B&W | 9-12 | doc pdf | doc pdf | 10 | letter a4 |
| Paperback | 10 up | doc pdf | doc pdf | 10 | legal b4 |
| Hardback | 12 up | doc pdf | doc pdf | 12 | letter a4 |
| español | 12 up | doc pdf | doc pdf | 10 | letter a4 |
| Legal | 11 up | doc pdf | doc pdf | 24 | legal b4 |
| Flipchart | 11 up | doc pdf | doc pdf | 36 | legal b4 |
| Slides | 11 up | ppt htm | ppt | 26 | screen |
| " Outline | 11 up | ppt | ppt | 32 | screen |
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The B&W pocket primers print well on black-ink printers.
Covers printed on heavy card stock are nice for paperback and hardback size booklets. The paperback size includes voting cards.
If you would like more numbers and logic with fewer pictures, Democracy Evolves is again free to browse or print: doc, pdf. It prints in B&W on eight letter-sized A4 pages, no cuts or folds. (The first page has the introduction to this primer; the rest add to it at a college level.)
This is “open source” writing, so edit the slides as you will and add your own slides for other topics. For example, U.S. voters need concise statements of the principles and benefits in non-partisan redistricting, as practiced in Iowa, and public campaign funding, as practiced in Arizona, Maine, or North Carolina. You may want to skip some topics or change the wording to suit an audience. For legislators you might change “voter” to “rep” or “member” and you would do the opposite for a direct democracy. The latter might omit Instant Runoff Voting but keep Full Representation to select subcommittees. Thanks to Steve Chessin for writing the original version of the “elevator pitch” for Full Representation. He, Terry Bouricius, and Zo Tobi each wrote quick pitches for Instant Runoff Voting which were the basis for the IRV slide above. Overall editors include Tree Bressen, Cheryl Hogue, John Richardson, and Rob Richie. Many others have contributed ideas and writing. ![]() Navigation: This page showed the need for better voting rules and their merits. The next page, a voting workshop, shows the simple steps in each tally and how they meet their goals. After that, you may want to read the one-page introduction to each of the six voting tasks. These tell how a task is like and unlike other uses of voting, what it must do, stories of tragedy and success, the best rule's name, its ballot and its main merits. Accurate Democracy is organized by uses of voting:
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Print. |
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