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| “This is *the* site for learning about democracy.”  —Zoe Weil, author of *Most Good, Least Harm*, president of the Institute for Humane Education  “... a huge contribution to the democracy cause.”  —John M. Richardson Jr., former chairman of  The National Endowment for Democracy  “Congratulations on a brilliant piece of work.”  —Robert Fuller, former president of Oberlin College, author of *Somebodies and Nobodies*, and *All Rise*  The primer, games and pictures let you  **Read, Touch and See How**  The best types of voting are quick and easy, **centered and stable,** **yet inclusive and fair.**   They help groups, from classrooms to countries.  **One** tool compares the votes for several  $ $ $  $ $ $  $ $ $  **1**  versions of a **policy**. Two tools give  fair shares of seats or $pending.  **Share** this colorful  booklet with friends.  **Grow** support in your  school, club or town. **Enjoy** better relations,  politics and policies. | **ACCURATE DEMOCRACY**  **Loring**  **FairVote** | 5.1 0.34 5.1.  🞼  **Accurate**  **Democracy**  ***Cvr50wide4* Great Tools in Color**  **Help Groups from Classrooms to Countries** |

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| Some Users and Endorsers  1. Ranked Choice Voting, RCV, elects leaders  in more and more places: New York City and San Fransico, Alaska and Maine; plus colleges such as Duke, Harvard, Prince­ton, Rice, Stanford, Tufts, MIT, Cal Tech, Carlton, Clark, GWU, Reed, Vassar, UCSC, the state universities in: Houston,  CA, IA, IL, MA, MI, MN, NC, OK, TX, VA, WA and WY.  2. Multi-winner PRCV can elect a whole council.  Australian and Irish voters have used Proportional Ranked Choice Voting (PRCV), in local and national elections.  Users include Cambridge MA, Portland ME and Portland OR; plus colleges such as Carnegie Mellon, Clark, MIT, Oberlin, UC Cal, UC Davis, UCLA, UCSB, UT Austin and Vassar.  **Many groups endorse Ranked Choice Voting**.  Organizations: Oscars, Church of England, Common Cause, Sierra Club, UUA, American Academy of Arts & Sciences,  The League of Women Voters in: AZ, CA, FL, ME, MA, MN, NC, OR, SC, VT, WA, and more  National Newspaper Editorials: *New York Times, USA Today, Washington Post*; Local Papers: *Portland Press Herald, Las Cruces Sun News*, and many more  Journalists: David Brooks, Hendrik Hertzberg, and more  Celebrities: Jennifer Lawrence, Krist Novoselic, and more  US Senators: McCain, Murkowski, Obama, Sanders, more  US Reps: Keith Ellison, Jamie Raskin, Don Beyer, more  Parties: **Democrats** of CA, CO, ME and MA; Green Party, Libertarian Party; **Republicans** of Alaska, UT, VA, more.  fairvote.org/our-reforms/ranked-choice-voting-information/ | | |  Hendrix,  fairvote.org/editorial\_board\_support\_for\_rcv\_in\_2018    | | | About Us  About  info@fairvote.org  FairVote is a nonpartisan organization working for better elections for all. We research and advance voting reforms that make democracy more functional and representative for every American, with a focus on two key reforms: ranked choice voting and the Fair Representation Act.  Through our research and advocacy, we are making  the case for reform at the federal, state, and local levels  and empowering state and local allies with the resources they need to drive reform in their communities. Working together, we’ve already made ranked choice voting the fastest-growing nonpartisan voting reform in the nation.  About My Work VotingSite@gmail.com  In 1990, John Chamberlin, and Samuel Merrill each encouraged me to use their statistical research, cited on page 63, to support a hybrid Condorcet-RCV tally. (See page 30.) In the 1990s, I created *PoliticalSim*™ and *SimElection*™.  They compared 30 single- and multi-winner tallies from around the world and were used in a few universities. (See pages 48-56.)  Pages 48-56 show basic maps from the simulation games. My sim research led to *Democracy Evolves*11 in 1997. Then I helped FairVote as a webmaster and librarian.  For over ten years, I’ve advised some groups developing their  use of successfully tested Fair Share Voting. ([See pages 24](#FairShareVoting), 43 and 46.) This booklet summarizes *Accurate Democracy.com*.12  **Goals**: Make excellent policies. (See pages 9 and 61.) Give more incentive to work together for better harmony even in diverse communities. (See 24, 27, [33](#Condorcet)-35 and 54.) giving better incentives to voters and leaders. |

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|  | Glossary and Index  **Accurate democracy** gives groups fair shares of seats and spending It cuts scams and enacts a policy that tops all rivals.  *4 goals*  a **Mandate** is the authority effective votes loan to a     Pages  winner. It is a basic goal. Contrast a wasted vote. **11**-, 21, 57  a **Majority** is more than half of the votes. **11**-, 14-, 30-, 56  a **Plurality** option has the most votes — often not a majority. **"** **rules** use yes-or-no voting; contrast RCV 4-**6**, 11, 23, 31-, 61 Most pages in Part 1 show some problem in plurality voting.  4-6, 14-15, 20.  a **Ranked Choice Vote** lets you rank your first choice and backups.  It is a tool for effective votes and fair shares **14**, 33, 45  a **Voting** **Rule** (algorithm, method, system, tally, tool) has defines a ballot, tally steps, and  a level of support needed to for a win (eg. majority or plurality) . 6, 14, 21, 24, 30, **42**-  a **Wasted vote**, for a loser, a winner's surplus or a powerless rep, discourages voting and weakens democracy.  **12**-18, 23, 27  a **Wrecking amendment** ruins a bill’s chances or its effects.  a **Free-rider "** doesn't relate to the original bill. 30, **33**, 36  See also the **Summary and Index of Benefits** on page 34.  Acronyms and Synonyms  Pages  Consensus process 33, **36-**  CT,Condorcet Tally, Pairwise Comparison 28-**30**-, 44, 54-56  **EC**, Ensemble Council of **CT** plus **FR** ***New*** **8**-, 31, 54-55  **FR**,**Fair Rep**, Fair Representation (US); PR, Proportional  Representation. (See PRCV, STV below.) 7, **16**-21, 54, 61  **MMP**, Mixed-Member Proportional 19-20, 55  **FSV**, Fair Share Voting ***New*** 22-**24**-, 36-, 43, 46, 52-  **RCV**,Ranked Choice Voting: (US)STVSingle Transferable Vote,  PRCVProportional RCV, for Fair Rep. **42**, 48-51, 54  **IRV**, Instant Runoff Vote (US), Majority Preferential Vote (Aus),   AV, Alternative Vote (UK) or Hare, for SMD. **14**, 39-42, 56  **SMD**,a Single-Member District, contrast FR, PR. **6**, 16, 19 | Reform steps 4 3 2 1  4    3  2  1 | **\*\* Paradigm shift – see pages 15, 22, 57** .4.6 0.8 4.6  AccurateDemocracy  These 4 Great tools make group decisions better. They help groups from classrooms to countries.  Robert B.lair Loring    Voters Cue, Striving for Better Government.  Silver Spring, Maryland | Here is space.  for you to note.  your hopes.  and plans to.  use these.  voting tools.  Here is space.  for you to note,  your hopes.  and plans for.  tools to vote.  Û An open space  for noting,  your hopes and plans  for voting. 🡳 |
|  | ***N €w* *N ¥w***    ***Free Tools***  ***N ₤w* *N $w***  **\ /**  We feel this **information** should be free,  But to print and mail a **color** book costs over $10.  So we print few copies and give away the ebook:  [https://AccurateDemocracy.com/**AcDem**.pdf](https://www.AccurateDemocracy.com/AcDem.pdf) It is always the most up-to-date edition.  **\ /**  Please let others **share** this to improve  voting in your clubs, school, city and state. What will you do or give to live in a more educated and accurate democracy? Consider  helping the educational nonprofit **FairVote.org**  **|** ☟☜🖐 ☞ ✌ ☮ **🟑 ✇ ♥|**  Photo **credits** and thanks to: Rawpixel, cover;  Voters Reflecting on “Freedom Day”, Adrian de Kock, title page, Cape Town, South Africa, 1994; Kiichiro Sato, page 5; Mercedes-Benz, page 38;  Wikimedia, page 43; Minnesota Public Radio, page 47; Flickr pool, Local Living Venture, page 59 Others lacked attribution. All photos altered.  **| |**  © CC BY-SA 3.0 2025, Robert B. Loring  AccurateDemocracy and its logo are trademarks.  We encourage reviews, reprints and translations.  www.[accuratedemocracy.com/z\_prints.htm](http://www.accuratedemocracy.com/z_prints.htm) preview of ISBN 978-1-7362637-0-9  **/ \**  Kindly send your requests, suggestions,  questions or compliments to me at | Damien Cave. “Jacinda Ardern Sold a Drastic Lockdown With Straight Talk and Mom Jokes”. nytimes.com/2020/05/23/world/asia/jacinda-ardern-coronavirus-new-zealand.html Defines MMP | 4 Compare the math scores on, pages 60-61. ⓐ d\_stats.htm  5 Chalmers, Patrick. “The People Trying to Save Democracy From Itself”, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/02/democracy-tarnished-brand-desperate-need-reinvention  Lerner, Josh. 2024. ***NEW*** “From Waves to Ecosystems: The Next Stage of Democratic Innovation”. SNF Ithaca Research Scholar White Paper No.1. Newark, DE. Ithaca Initiative. udspace.udel.edu/handle/19716/34515.  Mineo, Liz; How can we restore civil dialogue in the nation? Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ, 2021. https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/05/ jane-mansbridge-offers-a-solution-to-mending-a-riven-democracy/  Navajas, Joaquin et al; “Aggregated knowledge from a small number of debates outperforms the wisdom of large crowds”, (Cornell U., 2017) https://arxiv.org/abs/1703.00045 + info.vtaiwan.tw  6 Tishman, Shari and Albert Andrade. *Thinking Dispositions*, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/57cb/278acf38e9da6490d266260f9a9c50d20da3.pdf Few have the disposition to think this way routinely.  7 See progressive taxes in Wikipedia pages on: [Carbon\_tax](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_tax), [Consumption\_tax#Expenditure\_tax](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consumption_tax#Expenditure_tax), [Location\_value\_tax](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgism), [Financial\_transaction\_tax (speculation)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_transaction_tax), and Weath\_tax.  Piketty, Thomas and Arthur Goldhammer. *Capital in the 21st Century*; (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press, 2014)  8 https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2018/01/communityfiber Institute for Local Self-Reliance www.ilsr.org www.windsong.bc.ca  9 Loring, Robert. Egalitarian v. Authoritarian Values ⓐa\_quotes.htm#egal.  https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens\_and\_page\_2014\_-testing\_theories\_of\_american\_politics.doc.pdf  10 Taub, Amanda; https://psypost.org/2018/06/study-finds-less-corruption-countries-women-government-51530  Damien Cave. “Jacinda Ardern Sold a Drastic Lockdown With Straight Talk and Mom Jokes”. nytimes.com/2020/05/23/world/asia/jacinda-ardern-coronavirus-new-zealand.html Defines MMP  11 https://web.archive.org/web/19990218104532/http://members.aol.com/loringrbt/elect.htm ⓐarchive/Democracy\_Evolves\_1997/elect.htm  12 web.archive.org/web/19991023011241/http:/members.aol.com:80/loringrbt/a\_intro.htm  Share the **eBook**: AccurateDemocracy.com**/**AcDem.pdf   It is always the most up-to-date edition.     67 |  |
|  | B. Workshop Games, hold a vote ⓐ a\_workshop.htm  1 A voter’s ranks may skip around, *e.g.* 1st left, 2nd far right, 3rd center.  2 A Simple Tally ⓐp\_tally.htm#tech Other Budget Rules ⓐ q\_other.htm  3 FairVote. “Ranked Voting and Election Integrity”, 2013. fairvote.org/ranked-voting-and-questions-about-election-integrity/  www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=25120  Election Audits, http://electionaudits.org/ http://www.verifiedvoting.org  4 Portland Voters Overwhelmingly Support Ranked Choice Voting, 2015 fairvote.org/portland\_voters\_overwhelmingly\_support\_ranked\_choice\_voting  5 Krosnick, Jon A. "In the Voting Booth, Bias Starts at the Top", *NY Times*, http://nytimes.com/2006/11/04/opinion/04krosnick.html  + https://www.fairvote.org/rcv\_ballot\_design  + A ballot by a developer of FSV http://tupelo-schneck.org:8080/tag/  6 https://AccurateDemocracy.com/a\_teach.htm  7 www.youtube.com/watch?v=oHRPMJmzBBw or v=\_5SLQXNpzsk https://accuratedemocracy.com/d\_stv2d.htm ⓐ p\_tools.htm  + https://www.collegeciviclearning.org  C. Simulation Examples, compare rules ⓐ [d\_stv2d.htm](http://accuratedemocracy.com/d_stv2d.htm)  1 Loring, Robert. simelection.com 1996 http:politicalsim.com  https://accuratedemocracy.com/d\_stv2d.htm ⓐ p\_tools.htm  2 Lorence, Stella; “Massachusetts Voters May Face Ranked Choice Voting Question...”. BU News Service. 3/3/2020. Quote from Dr. Moon Duchin, founder of MGGG Redistricting Lab, Tufts University.  3 See entries for Chamberlin et al; or Merrill III; or Green-Armytage.  + Brady, Henry E. "Dimensional Analysis of Ranking Data",  American Journal of Political Science. 34 (11/90)  🟋 Back Matter ⓐ a\_goals.htm ⓐ z\_review.htm  1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy\_voucher  Ackerman, Bruce; and Ian Ayres. *Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance*; (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 2002)  2 Gifts to "spoilers" are less effective under Ranked Choice Voting. Multi winner districts make it hard to aim money at just one seat.  3 nytimes.com/2018/06/23/opinion/sunday/james-e-hansen-climate-global-warming.html also, “conservation ... depends on effective  governance;” https://www.nature.com/articles/nature25139. 66 On Solar Streets and Wilderness Alleys |  | Contents  $ $  $  $ $  **1**  The **four** best voting tools are fast, easy and fair.  Parts **A,** **B,** and **C** reveal how tools steer power.  **A. Voting Primer** tells the stories of the **four** tools:  Bunting1RBTragedies, Eras and Progress of Democracy 4  1. Ranked Choice Voting elects a widely-popular Leader  10  2. Fair Representation elects a balance ofRepresentatives 16  3. Fair Share Voting sets optionalBudgets ***New*** 22  4. Condorcet Tally enacts a balanced **Policy** ***"*** 28  Bunting1RBRigged votes, Gerrymanders and Gridlock 32  **🟑 Social Effects** of group-decision tools**🟑 **★ 34  Bunting1RB**Consensus** on one Policy or many Budgets 36  Bunting1RBHow your group can try a decision tool 38  **B. Workshop Games** let us get inside the **four** tallies:  1. Leader, 2. Reps, 3. Budgets, 4. Policy ***New!*** 39  **C. SimElection**™ **maps** make tally patterns visible:  2. Reps, 3. Budgets, **Council**, 4. Policy ***New*** 48  **Back Matter**:Voting reforms aid more reforms   57  Bunting1RBTables, Endnotes and References 60  Bunting1RBGlossary and Index, About Us 68 |  |
|  | A. Voting Primer  Two of Many Tragedies  **Old ways of adding up votes often** **fail** to represent large groups. In the USA, beautiful North Carolina had enough Black voters to totally fill two election districts, but, spread out over eight districts they were a minority.  So for over 100 years, they won no voice in Congress. As voters, they were silenced—with tragic results.1  The Northwest tore itself apart by changing forestry laws again and again. When forestry laws are weak, hasty logging wastes resources. But sudden limits on logging can bankrupt some workers and small businesses.2 If this **policy pendulum** swings far, it cuts down forests and species, then families and towns, again and again.  bl2  What can big swings in other policies do?  4 |  | **4. Enacting a Policy**, Condorcet Tally ⓐ l\_intro.htm l\_motion.htm  1 From Chamberlin, Cohen, and Coombs, cited on page 63 above.  2 Myers, Andrew C. *The Frequency of Condorcet Winners in Real Non-Political Elections*. cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/civs24/  Green-Armytage, James. "Four Condorcet-Hare Hybrid Methods for single-winner elections"; 2011; votingmatters.org.uk/ISSUE29/I29P1.pdf  "Strategic Voting and Nomination"; *Social Choice and Welfare;* 2014.  Tideman, Nicolaus. *Collective Decisions and Voting;* (Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Hampshire, England; 2006) page 232.  Green-Armytage, James; Nicolaus Tideman and Rafael Cosman. "Statistical Evaluation of Voting Rules" *Social Choice and Welfare;* 2016, 46: 183.  Chamberlin et al above, also Merrill. ⓐ c\_data.htm ⓐ l\_data.htm  Loring One-winner Rule, 1996; ⓐ l\_lor1.htm  Hill, I.D. “Some Aspects of Elections–To Fill One Seat or Many” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A. Vol. 151, No. 2 (1988), pp. 243-275 https://doi.org/10.2307/2982757  2b These follow from Later-no-harm and Later-no-help criteria.  3 See the captions on pages 15 and 56. ⓐ c\_irv.htm#compare  4 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary\_challenge  5 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/10/opinion/house-representatives-size-multi-member.html  6 Rules of Order https://AccurateDemocracy.com/l\_motion.htm  7  fairvote.org/basalt\_mayoral\_race\_features\_ranked\_choice\_voting  + https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/a-better-way-to-look-at-most-every-political-issue/552752/  🟑Social Effects of Group-Decision Tools  1 Bennett-Smith, Meredith. *World's Happiest Countries 2013,* http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/28/worlds-happiest-countries-2013-australia\_n\_3347347.html; Cites UN, OECD.  *OECD Better Life Index* http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/  Rothstein, B. and E. Uslaner. “All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust” *World Politics*, Vol. 58, # 1, October 2005, pp. 41-72 https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/gov2126/files/rothstein\_2005.pdf  2 Susskind, Lawrence and Jeffrey L. Cruikshank, *Breaking Robert’s Rules*; (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) Spanish: *Mejor Que La Mayoria,* with Francisco Ingouville, (Buenos Aires, Obelisco, 2011)  3 *Group-Process Pattern Language*, http://groupworksdeck.org  4 wikipedia.org Committee\_of\_the\_whole Special\_rules\_of\_order https://AccurateDemocracy.com/l\_motion.htm 65 |  |
|  | 2. Electing Representatives, Fair Rep ⓐ d\_intro.htm  4 Roberts, Nigel. *New Zealand: A Long-Established Westminster Democracy Switches to PR*, (Stockholm, IDEA, 1997)  www.nigel-roberts.info/NSR-in-Reynolds-&-Reilly-1997.pdf  5 Mathews, Dylan. “3 Reasons New Zealand has the Best Designed Government in the World” www.vox.com/2014/9/23/6831777/new-zealand-electoral-system-constitution-mixed-member-unicameral  Mathew Soberg Shugart. Emergency Electoral Reform. USA. Jan 2021.  fruitsandvotes.wordpress.com/category/american-political-reform/  6 Richie, Rob and Andrew Spenser. “The Right Choice for Elections” *University of Richmond Law Review*; vol. 47 #3, (March 2013) https://lawreview.richmond.edu/files/2013/03/Richie-473.pdf  7 Krook, Mona Lena. *Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide*; (Oxford U. Press, 2009) 123.  Healy, Andrew and Jennifer Pate. 2011. “Can Teams Help to Close the Gender Competition Gap?” *Economics Journal*, 121: 1192-1204 https://web.archive.org/web/20170706034311/http://myweb.lmu.edu/ahealy/papers/healy\_pate\_2011.pdf  8 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/upshot/women-actually-do-govern-differently.html pages 60-61 above, and ⓐ d\_stats.htm  www.nytimes.com/2020/05/15/world/coronavirus-women-leaders.html  **3. Allocating Budgets**, Fair Share Votingⓐ p\_intro.htm  FSV=PRCV if $# = voters#, 1 share = $1, and 1 seat costs $# / (seats+1)  1 Shah, Anwar ed. *Participatory Budgeting*; The World Bank; Wash. DC; siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/ Resources/ParticipatoryBudgeting.pdf  2 Moore, Joe. *Participatory Budgeting in the 49th Ward*, http://participatorybudgeting49.wordpress.com/  In 2014, voters in Cambridge, Massachusetts saw similar results.  3 Tupelo-Schneck, Robert and Robert B. Loring, *Fair Share Voting*, for PB Conference **slideshows**, NYC, 2012. [ⓐ p\_intro.htm](http://accuratedemocracy.com/p_intro.htm)  4 News of the Oaks, *Leaves of Twin Oaks*, Louisa, VA, USA; 1995, 2013.  5 Oaks, Adder. “[Participatory Budgeting in an Income Sharing Com­munity](http://www.ic.org/participatory-budgeting-in-an-income-sharing-community/)”, *Communities: Life in Cooperative Culture;* #175, June 2017.  *Leaves of Twin Oaks*, 2013. A budget *cut* required 55% of the voters. ic.org/participatory-budgeting-in-an-income-sharing-community/  6 Proportional PB with Additive Utilities, 2022 arxiv.org/pdf/2008.13276.pdf  [pbstanford.org/dieppe2015/ranking](https://pbstanford.org/dieppe2015/ranking)  [pbstanford.org/nyc8/knapsack](https://pbstanford.org/nyc8/knapsack)  64 |  | What’s Wrong  We all know how to take a vote when there are only two candidates: We each vote for one or the other. In this simple contest, the yes or no votes say enough.  But as soon as three candidates run for one office, the contest becomes more complicated. Then that old yea or nay type of voting is no longer suitable.3  It's even worse at giving fair shares of council **seats**, setting many **budgets**, or finding a balanced **policy**. Our **defective voting rules** come from the failure to realize this:  *There are different uses for voting, and some need different types of voting.*  Kiichiro Sato AP Mirror  Will their votes be effective?  5 |  |
|  | Eras, Tally Rules and Councils  In the 19th Century Winner-Take-All Districts ⇒ Off-Center Councils    $ $ $ Policies $ $ $  Typical Council Elected by Plurality Tallies  Some of England's former colonies still count votes by its old **plurality voting rule**. It elects only one rep from each district, that is a Single-Memeber District or SMD. Winning the district's 1 seat does not require a majority. It merely elects the one who gets the most yes votes.\*  A district with only one rep tends to develop only two big parties.4∵ ∴ Only their candidates have good chances. It gets worse: A district's bias often makes it a “safe seat” a captive audience for *one* party. So voters in a plurality district are given little or **no real choice**. 5  If the voters in a few districts *are* given real choices, all power might flip from one faction of reps to another.   (The blue reps🚹have a majority in the picture above. 🡑) Hopes and fears of sudden **$**policy flips polarize politics. Each battle is brutal in part because it’s **winner take all**.  6 \* Each voting rule or system defines its ballot and its tally. | Such rules fail to find a central majority.  abruptly  That foments hysteria in fears of policy reversals.  Fears of big swerves can polarize political passions.  John, Sarah; Smith, Haley; Zack, Elizabeth. “The alternative vote: Do changes in single-member voting systems affect descriptive representation of women and minorities?” sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379417304006 | **1. Electing a Leader**, Ranked Choice Voting, ⓐ c\_irv.htm  1 Chamberlin, John R., Jerry L. Cohen, and Clyde H. Coombs; "Social Choice Observed: Five Presidential Elections of the American Psychological Association" *Journal of Politics*. 46 (1984): p. 479-502.  "An Investigation into the Relative Manipulability of Four Voting Systems", *Behavioral Science*; 30:4 (Jan. 1985) pages 195-203.  Merrill, Samuel III. *Making Multi-candidate Elections More Democratic*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988)  2 The Editorial Board. “The Primaries Are Just Dumb.” nytimes.com /2020/02/26/opinion/democrats-primary-south-carolina.html  3 *Ranked Choice Voting Civility Project* fairvote.org/rcv\_civility\_project  Reilly, Ben. *Democracy in Divided Societies* (Cambridge U. Press, 2001)  nytimes.com/2021/02/25/opinion/elections-politics-extremists.html  4 Wright, Stephen G. “Voter Turnout in Runoff Elections”, *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May, 1989), pages 385-396  http://www.fairvote.org/ranked\_choice\_voting\_outperforms\_runoffs\_in\_upholding\_majority\_rule  5 Korean election,  web.archive.org/web/20010113205900/http://nimbus.ocis.temple.edu/~jhurewit/history.html [wikipedia.org/wiki/Roh\_Tae-woo](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roh_Tae-woo)  6 *Papua New Guinea: Electoral Incentives for Inter-Ethnic Accommo­dation* http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/annex/esy/esy\_pg  7 https://www.fairvote.org/rcv\_in\_campus\_elections https://www.fairvote.org/where\_is\_ranked\_choice\_voting\_used  8 representwomen.org/representation\_and\_rcv\_a\_long\_term\_solution  2. Electing Representatives, Fair Rep ⓐ d\_intro.htm  Statistics on pages 60-61 compare the stable democracies. More at https://accuratedemocracy.com/d\_stats.htm  2 Huber, John D. and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., “Congruence Between Citizens and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy,” *World Politics* v46 #3 (April 1994), pages 291-326.  3 “*Illinois Assembly on Political Representation and Alternative Electoral Systems*”, (IGPA University of Illinois, Spring 2001) http://www.fairvote.org/media/pep/execsum.pdf  *History of cumulative voting, 1870-1970: Three is better than one* http://www.lib.niu.edu/1982/iisr04.html  http://archive.fairvote.org/index.php?page=39&articlemode=showspecific&showarticle=1325 63 |  |
|  | Endnotes by Chapter  For each chapter, the endnote numbers restart at one.  I abbreviate and format as needed to fit the page width.  The website and free ebook have more complete citations.  I favor online sources that use data from real elections or realistic sims. This is essential for realistic research.  This is the first book about **Ensemble Councils**, **Fair Share Voting**, and rules of order for **Condorcet** **policies**. **Accuratedemocracy**.com **(ⓐ)** has pages on each voting rule. They add links, videos and free software:**ⓐ** [z\_tools.htm](http://accuratedemocracy.com/z_tools.htm).  ***FairVote.org*** has model ballots and bylaws, editorials, research reports, voter-education stories, videos and more.  Ranked Choice Voting Resource Center rcvresources.org  A. Voting Primer, Tragedies, Eras and Progress  + AAAS. *Our Common Purpose, American Democracy for the 21st Century.* https://www.amacad.org/ourcommonpurpose/recommendations  + Braun, Andrés and Cabrera, Alejandro. *Nosotros, la gente.* (Córdoba, Argentina: El Emporio Ediciones, 2021) *Argentina Tiene Solución*.  + Gehl, Katherine M. and Michael E. Porter; “Why Competition in the Politics Industry is Failing America;” Harvard Business School 9/2017. hbs.edu/competitiveness/research/Pages/research-details.aspx?rid=84  Amy, Douglas J. *Proportional Representation: The Case for a Better Election System*. NC is on page 30, http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=1606  2 Durbin, Kathy. *Tree Huggers: Victory, Defeat and Renewal in the North­west Ancient Forest Campaign* (Seattle, The Mountaineers, 1996)  3 Hoag, Clarence and George Hallett. *Proportional Representation*, (New York City, The Macmillan Company, 1926)  4 Duverger, Maurice. "Factors in a Two-Party and Multiparty System" *Party Politics and Pressure Groups* (NYC: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1972), 23‑32.  Rein Taagepera, and Mathew Soberg Shugart. *Seats and Votes: the Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale U Press, 1989.  5 FairVote. *Monopoly Politics 2020*, www.fairvote.org/monopoly\_politics  6 Lijphart, Arend. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994)  7 See pages 30, 31, and 54-56.  8 Statistics on page 60-61 compare nineteen stable democracies. 62 | *Argentina Tiene Solución*.  + Andrés Braun y Alejandro Cabrera. Nosotros la Gente. (Buenos Aires, 2022) For printing in English, the title is *Argentina Has Solution*. | In the 20th Century Fair-Rep Elections ⇒ One-Sided Majorities    $ $ $ Policies $ $ $  Typical Council Elected by Fair Representation  .  Each voting algorithm (method, process, rule, system, tally, tool).  is defined by its ballot, tally steps, and criteria required for a win.  Fair Representation was developed around 1900 to end some major problems caused by the plurality rule. Most democracies now use “Fair Rep.” It elects several reps from each election district. It gives a group that earns say, 20% of the votes, 20% of the council seats. Thus Fair Rep tallies give fair sharesof representation.6 It's often called Proportional Representation or PR.  It leads to broad representation of issues and views. But usually there is no central party (**C** above) and the two biggest parties normally refuse to work together. So the side with the most seats forms a ruling majority. Then they enact **policies skewed toward their side**.  7 |  |
|  | **In the 21st Century**  Ensemble Councils ⇒ Balanced Majorities      $ $ $ Policies $ $ $  Council Elected by Central and Fair-Rep Rules  Ensemble rules will elect most representatives by **Fair Rep** plus a few reps ( **C** above) by a **central** rule.  **Bunting1RB**So the points of view within the council will have a **spread** plus a pivotal **midpoint** that match the voters more accurately. **O** + • = That’s the target.\*  Later pages will show how we can elect a rep with wide support and views near the center of the voters.77  So winners will be near the center of a Fair Rep council. There they can be the council's **powerful swing voters**, with strong incentives to build moderate majorities.  Many voters in this wide base of supportwon’t want narrow centrist policies. They’ll likely want policies to combine the best suggestions from all groups.  8 \* Its colors suggest archery or political bunting. | The smallest narrowest majority has only C teal and blue reps. That 5 of 9 is more central than PRs. And the C reps need wide support to win their elections.  Purchasing power. wiki/Purchasing\_power\_parity | **Country**  **Women** **Health** **Poverty**%  **Seats** % **Turnout** **Math** **Murder**   |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **Fair Rep** page 16 | 37% | 75% | 15 | 503 | 13% | 12 | | Sweden9 14 | *44* | 86 | 23 | 502 | 8 | 10 | | Finland5 13 | 42 | 67 | 31 | 548 | 4 | 15 | | Spain46 6.7 | 41 | 69 | 7 | 480 | **20** | 6 | | Norway5 8.7 | 40 | 76 | 11 | 490 | 5 | 5 | | Belgium 8.4 | 39 | 89 | 21 | 520 | 13 | 16 | | Denmark5 15 | 38 | 88 | 34 | 513 | 4 | 10 | | Netherlands17 150 | 37 | 80 | 17 | 528 | 10 | 5 | | Austria8.6 19 | 28 | 82 | 9 | 505 | 8 | 7 | | Switzerland8 7.8 | 28 | **49** | 20 | 530 | 10 | 6 | | Costa Rica 21, 4 | 19 | 81 | 36 | **407** | - | **112** | | Uruguay 30, 2 | **13** | 90 | **65** | **409** | - | **111** | | **Mixed**  page 17 | 36% | 71% | 26 | 505 | 9% | 11 | | Germany 19, 1 | 39, 13 | 72 | 25 | 514 | 16 | 11 | | New Zealand 50, 1 | 45, 15 | 77 | 41 | 500 | 15 | 9 | | **PRCV**, **RCV** p.38,14 | 34% | 89% | 29 | 517 | 14% | 10 | | Australia 6, 1 | 38, 25 | *93* | 32 | 520 | 15 | 10 | | Ireland4.6 4 | **15** | 70 | 19 | 501 | 10 | 10 | | **Runoff** page 12 | 27% | **60**% | 1 | 496 | 11% | 12 | | France 1 | 27 | 60 | 1 | 496 | 11 | 12 | | **Plurality** page 6 | **25**% | 66% | **34** | **486** | **19**% | **42** | | Canada 1 | 26 | 68 | 30 | 527 | 15 | 17 | | United Kingdom 1 | 29 | 66 | 18 | 495 | 10 | 12 | | USA, 2022, 2024 1 | **24**, 25 | 47, 64 | 37 | **474** | **21** | **50** |   AccurateDemocracy.com/d\_stats.htm will add data on:  Corruption at transparency.org; Freedom at freedomhouse.org; Happiness, Leisure, Social trust, and Peace.  U.S. turnout rises >15% in presidential years. 1.29.25 61 | **~~Poverty~~**~~%~~  ~~Murder~~   |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | | 503 | 13% | 12 | | 502 | 8 | 10 | | 548 | 4 | 15 | | 480 | **20** | 6 | | 490 | 5 | 5 | | 520 | 13 | 16 | | 513 | 4 | 10 | | 528 | 10 | 5 | | 505 | 8 | 7 | | 530 | 10 | 6 | | **407** | - | **112** | | **409** | - | **111** | | 505 | 9% | 11 | | 514 | 16 | 11 | | 500 | 15 | 9 | | 517 | 14% | 10 | | 520 | 15 | 10 | | 501 | 10 | 10 | | 496 | 11% | 12 | | 496 | 11 | 12 | | **486** | **19**% | **42** | | 527 | 15 | 17 | | 495 | 10 | 12 | | **474** | **21** | **50** | |
|  | Better Voting for Better Living  This data suggests, to elect a great government that enacts superb health, education, tax7 and other policies, a country needs effective, not wasted votes.  Does **Fair Representation** elect more women? page18  Do they tend to raise health and education results?10 Can these lift low incomes and reduce violent crime?  Dovoter **turnouts** or seats won by **women** tend to be lower in countries with more: people? diversity? religion? polygamy? corruption? billionaires? militarism? hot days?*!* pathogens Are those harder to change than the voting rules?  FairVote IPU_logo http://www.haitilibre.com/images-a/g-9656.jpg  WHO_Logo oecdlogo UN_Logo  Data Definitions and Sources  Measures of respectable power and policies, circa 2016  **Seats** average per election district; Inter-Parliamentary Union  **Women %** of main legislature; Inter-Parliamentary Union  **Turnout %** Int'l. Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance  **Health Rank** first is best; World Health Organization  **Math Score** Program for Int’l. Student Assessment; OECD  **Poverty %** of children below half of median income; OECD  **Murder Rate** per million; 7th UN Survey of Crime Trends  Scores weighted by population give a voting rule’s average.  60 The table's **worst** numbers are in **bold**. | consensual. | |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | | Soapbox | **Progress of Democracy** | TV |   A centrist policy implements a narrow set of ideas. It blocks rival ideas: opinions, needs, goals, and plans. A one-sided policy also blocks rival ideas.  A compromise policy tries to negotiate all the ideas. But contrary ideas forced together often work poorly.  A balanced policy blends compatible ideas from all sides. This process needs advocates for diverse ideas. What’s more, it needs strong, independent **moderators.** These swing-voting reps can please their wide base of support by building moderate majorities in the council.  “By design, the system tends to establish the pre-. dominance of moderates, which gives it stability,  a necessary condition for anchoring legal security.”   ..— Andrés Braun  A broad, balanced majority works to enact broad, balanced policies. These tend to give the greatest chance for happiness/success to the greatest number of people.  Excellent policies are a goal of accurate democracy. *Measure* their success by the typical voter's education and income, freedom and safety, health and leisure.8  Older rules often skew results and hurt a democracy. An ensemble is **inclusive**, yet **centered** and ***decisive***— to help make its actions **popular**, yet **stable** and ***quick***. The best tools to set budgets or pick a policy will also show these qualities in our stories, graphics and games.  9 |  |
|  | 1. Electing a Leader  Nine Voters  Let’s think about this election: Nine voters want to elect a leader. The figures in this picture mark the positions chosen by these voters. They stand along a political spectrum from left to right. It is as though we asked them, “If you want high-quality public services and taxes like France or Germany please stand over  🡓 here. Stand here 🡓 if you want to be like Canada.  To be like the USA stand over here 🡓. For Mexico's  low taxes and government services, stand over there 🡓.”  Throughout this booklet, we're going to show political positions in this compelling graphical way.  Most people want excellent policies, freedom, human rights.  a voice in public policies, self determination.  A nation that respects its citizens tends to respect.  its neighbors peacefully. \*\*\*  Nine voters spread out along an issue.    High taxes buying Low taxes buying great gov. services poor gov. services  10 These colors aid readers less able to see colors. |  | Civil Society Builds Democracy  Merchants and workers in medieval guilds won  some rights by building **group** **skills**, unity and allies. Now local councils, co-ops and schools can build skills.  Empirical thinking grew in the Age of Enlightenment leading to revolutions for **human rights**.6 Now rights must include Fair Representation and Fair Share Voting.  A big need for workers has often raised their pay and political strength, thus the **political equality** of a society. Now more progressive taxes7 can help political equality.  Emigrate Ely Flower Bed n Panels sm  **Move to a more democratic place or group.**  To get good policies quickly, go where they are used. For example, do you want the democratic control and long-term savings of county or **co-op** **owned** utilities?8  CEOs may need to be assertive, but not authoritarian.   The latter corrupts commerce and wrecks human rights.9  Q*:* How can voting rules **reduce the abuse of power**?  A: *RCV rivals act nicer p.14. Swing reps moderate p.54. Fair Rep p.51, FSV p.24, & reforms on p.58 spread power.  But a winner-takes-all tally starts a bad pattern.*  59 |  |
|  | Voting Reforms Aid Related Reforms  **1**  **A top-four primary** then a Condorcet-RCV election puts a focus on four big candidates, with more hopes, fears and plans than just two rivals in a macho duel. To calm that fear, let voters rank their backup choices. **Ranked Choice Voting**, **RCV**,opens up elections.  **3** **A news firm** may serve us better if the subscribers steer more parts of it than the owners or advertisers do. There’s a low-cost method for any membership group: **Fair $hare Voting** can reward the best news bloggers.  **3** **Public campaign funding** lets reps and rivals give less time to their sponsors, more time to their voters. One plan gives each voter $50 of vouchers to donate.1 Such nameless gifts or **FSV** can cut corrupt paybacks.   Big $ponsors aim gifts to buy the few swing districts.2   **1**  **2**  **RCV** or **Fair Representation** make that harder. So big business and billionaires may buy fewer seats.  It's very hard to win votes when telling people they have to suffer present pain to avoid future suffering.\*\*\*.  *“It’s very hard to see us fixing the* ***climate*** *until we fix our democracy.” Dr. James Hansen3*  **1**  **2** **Good** **schools**, taxes and voting may go together.4 Schools build our group skills and political know-how.  **1**  **Sabbatical terms** make the current rep run against a former rep returning from rest, reflection and research. Then the candidates include two with records in the job! Two alike do not break apart a group that uses **RCV**.  **4**  **Citizens’ assemblies**5 and their referendums can get more choices and control by using **Condorcet Tallies**. The laws on voting rules, reps’ pay, $ponsors, etc., need  referendums because the reps have conflicts of interest.  58 |  | Plurality Election  Here we see three rivals step up, asking for votes.  Each voter prefers the candidate with the closest position. A voter on the left votes yes for the candidate on the left.  K is the candidate positioned nearest to four voters.  L is the nearest to two and M is the nearest to three.  Candidates L and M **split** the voters on the right.  Does anyone get a majority (over half), Yes or No? Who gets the plurality (the largest number), K, L or M? Who gets the second-largest number of votes, K, L or M?  *Answers to questions are at the bottom of each page.*      A mere plurality gives the winner a weak **mandate**.       This is the authority effective votes loan to a winner,    by consent not coercion. Strong mandates to winners      support and speed action to reach popular goals.  thru a process of consent. W The Engineering of Consent  By plurality rule, the one with the most votes wins.    K is nearest four voters. M is nearest three.  L is nearest two.  *Answers: No. K. M.* 11 |  |
|  | Runoff Election  From the plurality tally, the top two may advance to  a runoff. It eliminates the other candidates all at once.  The two voters who had voted for L now vote for M. Do they each have more power than some other voter?  **Wasted votes** **fail** to turn a loser into a winner.  **Effective votes** **succeed**; a voting tally with more    is more fair thus accurate, responsive and strong.  Does the plurality election waste more votes? Do wasted votes discourage people from voting? Does the runoff make a stronger mandate?  In effect, a runoff practically asks, “Which **side** is stronger?” Later, these voters will use another tally tool to ask, “Where is our center?” And a bigger group will use a tally to ask, “Which **trio** best represents us *all*”  In a runoff, the top two compete one against one.    Four **wasted votes**. Candidate **M wins** a runoff.  *Answers: No, each voter has one vote in each tally.*  12 *Yes, five. Yes. Yes, a majority mandate.* | More ballots became effective votes—a basic goal. | 🞼 Back Matter  Voting Reform Is Cost Effective  **Issue campaigns** teach voters and reps for years.  This eases one problem, but rarely fixes the source.  **Election campaigns** cost a lot all at once. The biggest faction can skew all policies for a few years.  **Reform campaigns** can cost less, yet RCV reforms can improve voting and results for many years.  Issue  Election  Reform  2024 2026 2028 2030  Campaign  **costs in green**, results in yellow.  Democracy’s need to educate many people slows decisions.  But it makes implimentation stronger.  Do efficient autocracies defeat defective democracies?.  Tyrants topple **easy-to-rig** democracies.  They resist anti-democrats.  Stronger Votes ∴ Mandates ∴ Policies  Ranked Choice Voting expands the base of power, the numbers of effective votes and voters supporting: Pages  **1**   a **CEO** or a Chair from a plurality to a majority 14, 31  **2**   a Council from a plurality to over three quarters 21  **3**   the Budget from a few power blocs to all voters 24  **4**   a Policy from a one-sided to an overall majority 30  Votes for real choices tally up real democratic power.  It needs big mandates to govern new nondemocratic powers in big money, media, marketing and more. Mandates aid actions to achieve popular goals.  They build up a democracy and its leaders. 57 |  |
|  | **4. Watch Condorcet Find the Center**  This map puts a line halfway between Al and a rival. Voters ● on Al’s side of each line are closer to Al, so they they rank Al over the rival. For example, The long line has more voters on Al’s side than on Joe’s. So Al wins that one-on-one test. Al wins a very different majority over each rival here. To do that, Al's political positions must be *central* and have *widespread support,* as described on page 31.    In contrast, PRCV requires the most intense support, first-rank votes, to avoid early elimination. See page 48 ● RCV1 does too, with a high finish line of 50% + 1 vote.  56 |  | Politics in Two Issue Dimensions  When more issues (or identities) concern the voters, a voting-tally rule keeps its character.1  Here we see voters choosing positions spread over two issue dimensions: left to right plus up and down. A person's position on one dimension is little help for predicting his or her position on the other one.  A voter may rank candidates on any issue(s). He prefers the candidate he feels is closest.  “Please step up for more protective regulations. Please step down if you want fewer protections.  Take more steps for more change race religion unions.”  The chapter on simulation games and research shows more tallies with two and even three issue dimensions.  Seventeen voters take positions on two issues:  more or less regulation 🡙 and taxes for services 🡘    K wins a plurality. M wins a runoff.  For clarity, a candidate is “she” and a voter is “he.” 13 |  |
|  | The goal of **Ranked Choice Voting** is this:  Elect a majority winner, from a single election.  Ranked Choice Voting is easy. Rank **your favorite** as first choice, **and backup choices**: second, third, etc. as you like.\* Your civic duty to vote is done.  Now your vote counts for your top-ranked candidate.  If no candidate gets a majority, the one with the fewest    votes loses. So we eliminate that one from the tally.    Your vote stays with your favorite if she advances.   If she has lost, then your vote counts for your backup.    This repeats until one candidate gets a majority.  RCV is NOT always step 1 toward AcDem; FSV was first at RRUUC & TO.  Why Support Ranked Choice Voting, RCV  **Backups give you more power and freedom** to express your opinions with less risk of wasting your vote.  You can't hurt your first choice by ranking a backup which does not count unless your first choice has lost.  No **worry about vote** **splitting** in a faction as votes for its loser(s) can count for each supporter's backup.  Civility **and consensus**2 **rise**3 as some candidates ask  the fans of rivals to, “Rank me as your backup.”  **🡥**  A majority winner from one election, so no winners  with weak mandates and **no costly runoff** election.  High voter turnout also creates **a strong mandate**. The turnout for an election runoff often goes down.4  14 \*Pages 33 and 45 show ballots; 39 shows a tally game. |  | **Well Centered and Balanced**  An Ensemble council combines  the breadth and balance of Fair Representation  with the centering of *Condorcet*.  **File Edit Window Organize Fund  Campaign**  Chart Cropped  A council’s **swing voter** on a regulation or a budget can strongly influence but not dictate those decisions. (Some voters want authoritarian certainty, more than human rights.  Proportional RCV works to elect a balanced council with moderates and often a centrist. But it does not motivate any rep to please *central majorities* of voters.  *Condorcet* does. 55  Ë |  |
|  | **Contrast 3 Councils, Each Has 5 Seats**  Bunting1RB1. The Loring Ensemble Rule elects a few reps by a Condorcet Tally, the rest by a Proportional RCV tally.  On this map, a Condorcet Tally elects **Al** then Fair Rep by four-seat Proportional RCV elects **Bev**, **Di**, **Fred** and **Joe**. The map shows each winner’s name in **bold.** Ú  • 2. The *Condorcet Series* elects the candidates closest to the middle of the voters: *Al, Bev, GG*, *Joe* and *Fred*. The lower right or southeast gets no rep; so the council  is not well balanced. Each winner’s name is in *italic*.🡪  CMN96164CFN96168bDot3c 3. Fair Representation by five-seat Proportional RCV  elects Bev, Di, Fred, GG and Joe.  Each name is underlined.  It eliminated Al***!***  CMY96176b  **X**  CFY96167  **Notice Two Surprises**  Bunting1RB1. It may be surprising that broad Fair Rep helps the *central* *Condorcet* winner be the council's **swing voter**. With these tools, political diversity can be a source of moderation as well as balance and a wide perspective.  Bunting1RB2. *Central reps* can lead a broad Fair Rep council to **broader majorities**, with moderates from *all* sides. This can add to or replace some of the “checks and balances” used to moderate a council's impacts.  54 | It breaks down tribalism. | **Ranked Choice Voting** **Patterns**  Running for president of South Korea, the former aide to a dictator faced two popular reformers. The two got a majority of the votes but split their supporters. So the aide won a **plurality** (37%, 28%, 27%, 8%). He claimed a mandate to continue oppressive policies. Years later he was convicted of treason in the tragic, government killing of pro-democracy demonstrators.5  A voter‘s backup is often like his favorite, but more popular. So by dropping one reformer, RCV might well have elected the stronger one with a majority.    1 2 3 4  **From a five-faction debate to a majority mandate** 1) **Violet** loses; so backup choices get those votes. 2) Amarilla loses; backup choices get those votes.  This **chief** **executive** starts in a big band of voters on the biggest side, then builds a majority. This helps her work with reps on the biggest side of a typical council.  🡪 For 11 years, Papua New Guinea used RCV, then plurality rule for 27 years but ethnic violence increased.  They returned to RCV and the violence decreased.6 Ranked Choice Voting weakens tribalism.  Irish and Australian voters have used RCV for decades. They call it the Alternative Vote or Preferential Vote. Some Americans call it Instant Runoff Voting, IRV.  The inside cover lists some groups using it in the USA.7  It often helps women achieve parity in politics.8 15 |  |
|  | 2. Electing Representatives  The principle of **Fair Representation** is:  **Get true majority rule by representing  each group in proportion to its voters.**  That is, 60% of the vote gets you 60% of the seats,  not all of them. And 20% of the vote gets you 20% of   the seats, not none of them. These are fair shares.  How does it work? There are three basic ingredients:  We elect more than one rep from an electoral district.  You vote for more than one; you vote for a list. You pick a group's list, or you list your favorites.  The more votes a list gets, the more reps it elects.  Why Support Fair Representation (Fair Rep)  **Fair shares** of reps go to the rival groups so **Diverse candidates** have real chances to win so Voters have **real choices** and **effective votes** so  **Voter** turnout is strong.1  **Women win** two or three times more often1 so **Accurate** **majorities** win—also due to more: choices, turnout, effective votes, and equal votes per rep so  **Policies match** public opinion better.2  Many people call this Proportional Representation or PR.  16 |  | **Campus Map**  FS Map Shelf_q6_c4  Any big group may focus or spread out their spending.  The **Loring Allocation Rule** uses a Condorcet Tally to fund a few items, then a fair share tally. The Condorcet Tally funds items with wide appeals to ad hoc majorities. It lets you vote for a sure winner without wasting any of your own power. Then the Fair Share tally funds items with narrower, more intense appeals. Elections, too,  may tally Condorcet then fair-share winners. 53 |  |
|  | **3. Simulation of Fair Share Voting**  Fair Share Voting helps voters organize many ad  hoc groups large enough to fund their favorite items.  Each voter may try to help a few groups give money  or labor space to one-time resource allocations (OTRAs) or even to optional items in some ongoing budgets (e.g.,  FSV can choose repairs for roads but not new routes.)  **To find the best buys for our money,  use Participatory Budgeting meetings then  Fair Share Voting ballots and tallies.**  This map shows the public plants proposed by voters on a campus. Often, the site closest to a voter is most useful to him and is his top choice. But this case has four distinct interest groups: **Red, Yellow, Green,** and **Blue.** Items can be close together on the map and yet be far apart in color. This map shows a third issue dimension as deep layers of color within the page.  This is a proposed **blue-flower garden.**  It is far from what the **red voters** want,  even if it is next door. A voter prefers  the closest item with their fave color.  Here a garden club had $240 to buy public plants and each interest group got a quarter of the votes. So how much did each group allocate?  **A red rosebush cost $30, two big sunflowers $15,** **an evergreen bush $20,** **a blue passionflower vine $60.** A group with only a few, low-cost proposals might be able to fund them all. Did that happen here?  52 *Answers: $60, $60, $60, $60.* *Yes for sunflowers.* |  | **Fair Shares and Moderates**  **Chicago** elects no Republicans to the State Congress, even though they win up to a third of the city's votes. But for over a century it elected reps from both parties. The state used a fair rule to elect 3 reps in each district. Most gave the majority party 2 reps and the minority 1. So no district was unwinnable and neglected by 1 party, a captive audience for the other party.  Those Chicago Republicans were usually moderates. So were Democratic reps from Republican strongholds. Even the biggest party in a district tended to elect more **independent**-minded reps.. They could work together for moderate policies.3  D_Equals  **✓** Shares of votes equal fair shares of seats.  New Zealand switched in 1996 from Single-Member Districts to a layer of **SMD**s within Fair Representation. This is called Mixed-Member Proportional or **MMP**. A small, one-seat district focuses more on local issues. Fair Rep frees us to elect reps with widespread appeals.  The seats won by women rose from 21% to 29%. The native Maori reps increased from 7% to 16%, which is almost proportional to the Maori population. Voters also elected 3 Polynesian reps and 1 Asian rep.4  17 |  |
|  | **Why Full Rep Elects More Women**  **New Zealand and Germany** elect half of their MPs in Single-Member Districts and half from Fair Rep lists. This is probably the best way to elect a parliament.5 The SMDs elect few women; but in the same election, the Fair Rep lists elect two or three times more women.1  A **safe nominee** for a two-party duel in an SMD is from the dominant gender, race, religion, etc. It leads to a macho duel and poor representation of all others.  Fair Rep leads a party to nominate a **balanced team** of candidates to attract voters. This promotes women.6 A team can have class, ethnic, and cultural diversity. And that gives us diverse reps to approach for help.  *MORE: Competition, Real choices, Voter turnout, Effective votes, Strong mandates, Diverse reps, Women reps, Popular policies*  Some leading women spoke of **starting a new party** in **Sweden**, which uses Fair Rep. Under plurality rule, a big new party splits its own side, so it likely loses. But Fair Rep gives every big party its share of seats.  This credible threat made an old party decide job experience was not as important as **gender balance**.  So it dropped some experienced men to raise women higher on the party’s list. And they won.7 Now they are incumbents with experience, power and allies.  18 |  | **A Diverse and Balanced Council**  10STVd10 11STVd11  **X**  This pattern of voters makes their choices easy to see. SimElection™ also created uniform, random, custom and normal bell-curve patterns for games and research.  To learn about life, play in lifelike normal patterns.3  In 13, the box with half the ballots holds all but one rep. Does PRCV tend to favor and elect fringe candidates? Five reps together need what percentage of the votes? Are the reps diverse? Balanced fairly? Centered well?  12STVd12 13STVd13  **X**  *No. Over 83%. Yes. Yes. See page 55.* 51 |  |
|  | **Votes Transfer, Elect Reps**  6)STVd6 7)STVd7  **X**  Pyramid AIn map 6, a candidate has just enough votes to win a seat. In map 8, a winner has **surplus votes**; a fair share goes to each supporter's next choice. ◆ ● ◼  The maps show only two issue dimensions. But a five-seat council can form decisions in 3D, if its reps are diverse. More issues and positions get represented in campaigns  and debates, then in policies and projects—all in **3D**!  “RCV... gives you proportionality on every axis.”2 🡘 🡙 ⭍  8)STVd8 9)STVd9  **X**  50 |  | **Voting Rules and Policy Results**  Local **SMD**s can elect reps with **unequal** vote totals. So a majority of reps might *not* represent most voters. **Fair Representation** has requires more equal votes for each rep (p. 20-21). So each majority of reps *does* stand for most voters. This produces **policies closer to public opinion**.2  *LESS: ~~Wasted votes,   Gerrymandered districts,   Monopoly politics,  Dubious democracy~~*  Many voters see a woman in a multi-winner race less as fighting her rivals and more as **supporting her issues** — in multi-sided conversations and debates.  Councils with fewer women tend to do less for health care, childcare, education and other social needs.8 Then the poorest schools and clinics are **blighted**; so are the poor health and education weaken hinder impair weaken enfeeble workers and children.  If such urgent needs overwhelm us, we neglect delay work on  the essential need to fix their **structural sources**.  The plurality rule is a key defective part to replace.  It wastes votes and underrepresents most voters.  It gives the reps less incentive to help most voters.  A more accurate democracy leads toward a better **quality of life**, as measured by the scores on page 60. We would all like better quality of life results for our country, and for our towns, schools, clubs and co-ops. So help friends to talk about and try these voting rules.  The Fair Rep games and sims will show more. 19 |  |
|  | Three Single-Winner Elections  A class of 27 wants to elect a 3-member committee. Someone says, “Elect a rep from each seminar section. To win here, you need to get the ballots of just 5 voters.”  PV_d_mmMmmmmm  **Section One's Election**  1 D vote  **wasted** on a loser  l l l l l l l  8 M  votes; 3 are  **wasted** on a surplus.  PV_cCccc_kkKk  **Section Two's Election**  5 C votes elect a rep.  l = = = = = l =  4 K  votes **wasted** on a loser.  PV_bbBbb_jJjj  **Section Three's Election**  5 B votes elect a rep.  lll ... l ... ... ... ... ...  4 J  votes **wasted** on a  loser.   An 11-voter minority gets 2 reps; that’s majority power.   But If spread out, with 3 or 4 in each section, they’d get no rep.   The plurality rule often **wastes votes** so it’s erratic andeasy to rig  elections by changing the borders of election districts. page 32  20 *How many votes were wasted? 12* |  | **The Weakest Lose, One at a Time**  2)STVd2 3)STVd3  **X**  **X**  In map 2, the first loser gets an **X**. Her ballots change color and shape when each counts for its new top rank, a close rival — whose nearby field of color grows. ● ◼ ● (Game maps may portray places or political positions.\*)  In map map 1, a gray line circles half the ballots. Candidates outside it lead their close rivals on the first ballot count. But in maps 2 and 3, as weak candidates lose, most of their ballots count for centrists or **moderates** inside that line.  4)STVd4 5)STVd5  **X**  **X**  \* Pages 10 and 13 introduced political dimensions. 49 |  |
|  | C. SimElection Games  **2. Watch Fair Rep Balancing a Council**  These maps show **Proportional RCV** ballots electing **five reps**. A little shape is a voter’s ballot; a big one is a candidate. Each little ballot has the color and shape of its current top choice, the closest remaining candidate.1  1) STVd1  Sim players position their candidates to get votes (page 56). The numbers on a map show each candidate's current share of top-rank votes; getting 16.7% will win a seat and halo! After this round of counting, the weakest candidate must lose and get an **X**. The 3**.**7%⬥ will be the first to lose.  48 To make close rivals distinct, colors vary from a spectrum. |  | **One Fair Representation** Election  A better idea: “Keep the class whole. Change the votes needed from 1/2 of a section to 1/4 of the class plus 1. To win here, you need to get the ballots of 7 voters.  A voter may rank a first choice and a backup choice.  If his first choice loses, his vote counts for his backup.”  PV_c_mmMmmmmk  **Three Sections Together In One Election**  **🞦** **7 voters rank M > K > J.**  M wins. Any surplus helps each voter’s backup.  l l l l l l l  PV_cCccc_kkKk  **🞦** **6 rank C > B.**  l = = = = = l =  5 votes help elect C.  4 votes help elect K.  PV_bbBbb_jJjj  lll ... l ... ... ... ... ...  B loses; these backup choices help elect C.  J loses;  these backup choices help elect K.  K  C  **Final** **11 C** (4 surplus) **7 M**  **9 K** (2 surplus)   Now the minority gets 1 rep and the majority gets 2. Their mandate is more fair, **accurate** popular and strong. The voters on the left chose rep **C**.  *How many votes were wasted? just 6* 21 |  |
|  | 3. Allocating Budgets  Progress In Democratic Rights **Fair Shares to Buy Shared Goods**  Electing reps is the most obvious use of voting rules. Rules to pick projects or a policy are also important.  These group decisions occur more often than elections. They even occur in many groups with no elections.  **Democratic rights progress.**  Some Democracies by big steps have worked hard to become more fair, thus accurate, responsive, widely popular and strong: wikipedia.org/wiki/Property\_qualification  **✓** Voting by noble men, most men, Black men, women; hard earned steps incl MagnaCarta1215, 1790-1856, 1863&1965, 1919.  1) More people get a **vote**, with a **backup** vote, for real **choices**, fewer ~~wasted~~ votes. 2) **More *effective* votes get the power to help elect one in a set of winners** \*\*\* e.g. 2) the reps on a PR council or 3) the items in an FSV budget.  Fair Representation can give out council seats fairly.  Fair Share Voting can give out some funding fairly.  It can give respect and energy to peaceful constructive civic communities local groups.  The voters in a club, a co-op, a college, or a grant giving group all can enjoy using Fair Share Voting.    Fair Representation can give reps to all large groups of voters including geographic, gender, economic, racial, and religious, interest groups. (But many we fund are shared by mere minorities!) It may even help in places with some diversity that could lead to violence.  **$** $ $ $ Policy $ $ $ $ **$**  All big groups have the right to spend some funds.  22 |  | Workshop Finale Notes  **It’s easy to give this workshop** in a class or a club.6 In an hour, 20 voters can review plurality, try RCV then **PRCV** for colors, as shown below, or **FSV** for treats.7  **Eat the winners*!*** while you plan to take a poll for the central majority or fair shares, in a group you know. What qualities do you want in this poll? (See page 34.)  **Voter education** can be fun to do and it is essential. ***FairVote***.org has model ballots, voter-education flyers, videos, stories and much more to help your voters.  Here’s a fun **music video** [flip2020.wordpress.co](https://flip2020.wordpress.com/2020/10/16/why-maine-part-2-ranked-choice-voting/)m  Some groups offer **apps to tally your votes**.  Here’s a list [AccurateDemocracy.com/z\_tools.htm](https://AccurateDemocracy.com/z_tools.htm)    Hands-on games and shared treats make memories  of how each tool *works*. Next, simple simulations and national statistics show some of the high-level *effects*. . The effects on pages 54 through 59 are important for the governance of schools, clubs, towns and more.  47 |  |
|  | Budget Levels Mande Long Ballots  These two cases taught us to avoid very long ballots:  We have seen Ranked Choice Voting for reps is easy.  It cuts worries about wasted votes, from your own ballot up to whole districts gerrymandered to waste thousands. The worries in the cases below didn’t occur in elections. Each of us had to **adjust** **too many budgets** all at once.  We can’t afford items *we* rank below **a costly favorite**:  Our ballot had 40 items. Most of us ranked a few higher than the costly sure winner. But, as we picked our higher treats from among so many items, most treats got just a few shares. So most treats lost, even some that a few of us had ranked higher over the sure winner. Then that costly favorite won, taking a lot of our money. Then that costly fave won, taking a lot of our money.    Wise voters ranked it high only at its low budget levels.  So they had some money left to help more items each reach fill up the base number of votes and thus qualify for funding.  **N€w** **N¥** **w**  **N₤w** **N$w**  Adjusting Many Ongoing Budgets Plan  Each year, we reset the levels of 50 ongoing budgets. Some voters said the **long ballot** was too hard and slow. Now, any**5**of us may propose a plan for these budgets. Most voters say it is easier to rank a few complete plans. This evaluates more than ranking every budget alone does: A plan may help more or less than the sum of its parts. And changing budget B may call for changing budget P.  A **Condorcet Tally** then picks one plan. It is likely to coordinate all of the budgets and it has majority support.  But it might be much nicer to a majority than to others.  46 | \*\*\* Good ballot design helps voters. Ranked Choice Voting for reps is as easy as we played it.  It doesnt raise the following concerns; they just relate to adjusting too many budgets  Voting to elect a rep or a counciil is simpler. Setting budgets is always slower than vtg for reps  run out of the **time and** energy  Voting for reps is free of the concerns below and on p. 14.  picked **his higher treats** from **among** so many **different** treats,  to **try to** help  2 reps of a kind is alway better.  **re**setting  LAR would Fund the sure winner wo/ using up a lot.  Voting for a set of budgets also avoids the sequence of winners and losers affecting the final set of winners.  *proposed* plan | Patterns of Unfair Funding  **Participatory Budgeting** (PB) lets neighbors research,  discuss and vote on how to spend part of a city's budget. In South America, it spread from one city in 1989 to hundreds today. Progress most often advances this way. The World Bank reports PB may reduce corruption and raise a community’s health and education.1  In 2010, a Chicago alderman gave $1,300,000 to PB.2 But a plurality rule made the votes and **voters unequal**. For example, in 2011 each vote to help a park won $501. That was its cost divided by its voters. But if cast for bike racks, each vote won a mere $31. That's too unfair. Even worse, most of the votes were wasted on losers.3  **✓✓✓✓**  **A costly winner makes many**  **lose.**  **.**  **.**    **.** **.**  A bad election rule gets worse when it picks projects. It is **not** **cost aware**, so it often funds a very costly item and cuts a bunch that get many more votes per dollar. To win this bad tally, load various proposals into one. Keep raising its cost if that attracts more votes.  One year, a scholarship fund got many **surplus votes**. These were wasted votes because they had no effect. So the next year, many supporters chose not to waste a vote on this “sure winner.” It lost*!* They saw the need for a voting rule that would not waste surplus votes.4  A voter’s PB share is sometimes over $1,000 *!* 23 |  |
|  | The principle of **Fair Share Voting** is:  **Give spending power to groups  in proportion to their voters.**  So 60% of the voters can spend 60% of the fund, not all of it. Your ballot’s **share** from the fund lets you vote to pay your shares of the costs for your favorite items.  Voting is easy: Simply rank your choices, as in RCV.  Your ballot pays one share of the cost for each of its present top ranks—as many as it can afford. A tally of all ballots drops the item with the fewest shares. Those two steps repeat until each remaining item gets full funding.3  Paying one share proves you feel the item is worth  its cost and you can afford it in your high priorities.  Some Merits of Fair Share Voting (FSV)  **Each winner is a popular priority worth its cost**:To qualify for funding from our group’s source, an item needs our “base number” of shares or voters or more.  **FSV is fair** to an item of any cost and to its voters: ∵ A ballot pays a costly share to vote for a costly item. cost **/** base=1 share *e.g.* $100/25 ballots=$4 If more ballots divide a cost, each of them pays less.  So a ballot's money can help more low-cost items.  This motivates each voter to give his top ranks to  the items that give him **the** **most joy per dollar**.  Carry on Ranked Choice Voting point 1 on page 16 plus 1, 2, 3, 4 on page 14.  24 | Budgeting optional items  Your duty to vote is done   :**|**  1) ABCD 2) BACD 3) BACD 4) CBAD 5) **CD**BA 6) **DC**BA 7) DCBA 8) DCBA 9) **BD**CA  Swap any DC & CD other pair.  Accurate Democracy and FairVote show more ballots. | Ranked Choice Ballots  A tally board might serve 30 voters. But it’s easier to mark **paper ballots** or webpages and tally by computer. Some groups need the secure paper ballots or printouts used by a **risk-limiting audit** to find frauds and errors.3   **Yes-or-no ballots** badly oversimplify most issues. They often highlight just two factions: “us versus them” and can **polarize** a community.  Bunting1RBO **Ranked choice ballots** reduce those problems. They let you rank your 1st choice, 2nd choice, 3rd etc. Ranks can reveal a great variety of opinions. Surveys find most voters like the **power** to rank candidates.4  **Our Menu #1** Fill only one “O” on each line.  Best **Ranks** Worst  lbs. **Treats 1**st **2**nd **3**rd **4**th **5**th **6**th  3 **Almonds, Toasted**  OOOOOO  7 **Apples, Honey Crisp** OOOOO  5 **Apricots, Dried** OOOOOO  6 **Oranges, Navel** OOOOOO  6 **Peaches, White** OOOOOO  6 **Tangerines** OOOOOO  Which one wins by plurality? Hints: 5 sweets versus 1 nut, and the top name on a ballot gets a 2% to 9% boost.5 Which wins by Ranked Choice Voting or by Condorcet?  We can vote for a party playlist, snacks, drinks and more. **Caution**: ballots with many contests might use up the  mental energy a voter needs to vote in each contest. 45 |  |
|  | 4. Condorcet Tally Centers a Policy  In a Condorcet tally, the winner must top each rival, one-against-one. Two games show how it works.  A_In4c1)Flag L stands at our center, by the median voter. Flags J, K and M surround L, 2 m. or yards from it.  A_In4c We asked nine voters: “Are you closer to J than to K?  If so, please raise a hand.” Only one raised a hand. We entered J vs. K, etc. in the pairwise table below.   |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **against** | **J** | **K** | **L** | **M** | | **for J** | — | 1 | 3 | 4 | | **for K** | **8** | 8+1=9 | 4 | **5** | | **for L** | **6** | **5** | — | **5** | | **for M** | **5** | 4 | 4 | 4+5=9 |   **The nine voters gave L a majority over each rival.**  A_In4c2)Flag L has a ribbon 1 or 2 m. long and a longer rope.  A_In4c If the ribbon reaches to you, the ribbon policy gets your vote with its narrow appeal.  A_In4c But if the ribbon cannot reach you, the wide appealof the rope policy gets your vote. Which one wins?   If the flags mark places for **a heater** in a cold room:  1. Do we put it at our center or in the biggest group?  2. Do we turn on its fan to spread the heat wide?  3. Do voters on the fringes have any influence?  4. Can the median voter enact any policy alone?  5. Do we get a balanced or a one-sided policy?  44 *Usually: Rope. Center. Yes. Yes. No. Balanced.* | **directors** “sanity check” the results.\*\*\*  The economic council’s plan won every year. Some voters complained, “My ballot had no effect!” Turnout fell lower. So now that team may present a few plans.  1. Should a member who pays more taxes or dues get more power to spend the group's money?  2. Could ranking lower choices hurt your first choice? . This trips more voters if prices differ by over ten to one | **Fair Shares and Majorities**  If a majority controls all the money, the last item they buy is a low priority; so it adds little to their **happiness**. But FSV makes some money buy *high* priorities of other big groups, adding more to their happiness.  **In political terms**: The total spending has a wider *base of support:* It appeals to more voters because more see their high priorities get funding.  In economic terms: The *social utility* of the money and winners tends to rise if we each allocate a share. Fair, cost-aware voting gives *more* voters *more*of what they want for the same cost = more satisfied voters. Shares also spread good opportunities and incentives.  **PB + multi-winner RCV + Cost aware ⇒**.  Share Blur USM 2 12 15 600 **✓** **✓**  *Items*  *Goods*  *Services*  *Projects*  *Programs*  *Budgets*  **✓** **✓**  **✓** Fair shares  spread the joy and opportunities.  **Plurality** rules let **surplus votes** **waste** a big group’s power, as seen on page 20, and let rival items **split** it. The biggest groups often have the biggest risks.  **FSV** **protects a majority’s right** to spend a majority of the fund. It does this by eliminating split votes, as did RCV, and surplus votes, as we’ll soon see.  25 |  |
|  | Setting Budget Levels  A co-op that helped develop Fair Share Voting lets each voter rank budget levels for *some* items.  A budget level needs to get the **base** number of votes. It gets one if a ballot offers to share the cost up to that level or a higher level. cost **/** base = 1 share = 1 vote You only pay up to a level you voted for and can afford.  The item with the weakest top level loses that level. Any money your ballot had offered to it moves down your ballot to your highest ranks that lack your support. This repeats until the top level of each item is fully funded by its supporters. Thus, fair shares and backup ranks select a set of winners with **more supporters**.  A_Budgets **✓**  **✓** **✓**  **Many voters must prove, "This cost  is a high priority within my budget."**  ⮞ My club with 100 membersset our **base** number at 25 votes.5 My first choice got just enough votes, so \* my ballot paid 4% of the cost. 100% **/** 25 votes = 4%  My second choice lost; did it waste any of my power?  My third choice got 50 votes, so my ballot paid only 2% of the cost.\* Was there any surplus? Did I waste much of my power by voting for this sure winner?  26 \* These are “reciprocals.” *Answers: None. None. Not much.* |  | **3. Fair Shares Buy Shared Goods**  For our tabletop tally of **Fair Share Voting**, **FSV**:  You get one share; here that's three 50¢ voting cards.  We decided an item needs modest support from six of us to prove it is a *shared*good worth shared funding. So the **finish line** marks the height of six cards, *and*  You may put only one of your cards into a column.  A costly item has several columns to fill. A column  here holds $3, so a $6 item needs two full columns.  **Rule B** lets you vote a 50¢ card, a 25¢ card half as tall, and a 75¢ card to boost your top choice (*without* inciting extreme high and low votes like point-voting ballots do.)  p_clouds  When an item wins, the treasurer hides its cards, then drops any item that costs more than all the cards left.  Then, one at a time, we **drop** the least popular item, the one with the lowest fraction of its columns filled.  **Move** your cards from a loser to your backup choices.  Repeat until we fill all of the columns still in the game.  Only a few items can win, but all voters can win***!***  **Rule C:** An app shows the cards pop onto the columns.2  It pops a tall card onto the 1st column of each voter’s fave.  Then a shorter card pops on each voter’s next column, etc. After placing all of the cards, it drops the weakest column and restarts, rebuilding the remaining columns from zero.  43 |  |
|  | **Quiz on RCV to Elect One**  1. How can your group use this voting rule?  2. A card you move counts just like others, True or False?  3. Ranking a backup can’t hurt your first choice, T or F?  4. Only one candidate can reach 50% plus a vote, T or F?  5. Name four cities or schools that use RCV. *Inside cover*  6. What benefits does it give them? *See page 14.*  **Answers:** *2) True, we count each card once in each round.*  *3) True, a backup doesn't count unless your 1st has lost.*  *4) True, more reps would need over 100% of the votes.*  **🡤** **🡥**  Ranked Choice Voting, includes **RCV1** and **PRCV.**  The inside cover lists some of the users. **🡣** Most of the groups tally their votes easily with apps.  **2. Fair Rep by Proportional RCV (PRCV)**  A tabletop tally to elect three reps works like **PRCV**.  We set the finish line at 1**/**4 of the cards plus one. Don't put your card on a column that is full.  One at a time, we drop the weakest candidate.  If your candidate loses, you can **move** your card.  **Repeat** until three candidates reach the finish line*!*  **Ask** the RCV1 questions above again for PRCV, adding:  4. Can only three candidates each win 25% plus a vote?  7. What total does a trio of reps win all together?  *Answers for PRCV: 6) See page 16. 7) 75%.*  PRCV is also known as Single Transferable Vote, STV. 42                    PRCV with a cost-aware tally gives us FSV.    **🡥** |  | More Merits of Fair Share Voting  After discussion, a **quick** poll can pick many items. It reduces **agenda effects** such as leaving no money for the last items or going into debt for them.  It lets subgroups fund items; so it’s like federalism without the layering of laws, taxes and bureaucracy. And it funds a big group even if they are scattered.6  Each big group controls just its share of the money.  This reduces the means and motives for **fighting**.  It makes becoming the plurality tribe less profitable.  **Fairness** **builds** **trust** in spending by subgroups and raises support for it. This can reduce spending at the extremes of individual and central control.  ***N €w* *N ¥w***  ***New Tool***  ***N ₤w* *N $w***  **Merits of FSV for an Elected Council**  FSV may give some funds to reps in the opposition, so Electing them is more **effective**, less of a wasted vote.  They can relieve starvation budgets that hurt projects. This makes project management more efficient.  A voter can see grants from his rep to each project, tax cut, or debt reduction; then hold her **accountable**.  Games may let us vote for treats and *eat the winners!* 27 |  |
|  | 4. Enacting a Policy  **Condorcet** Test Number Two  Page 12 showed a one-against-one runoff con- test between the policy positions of M and K. Five voters ranked M's position over K's: 5 > 4  Here is a second test with the same voters: K's position loses this one-against-one test. L's position wins by five votes to four: 5 > 4  Each person votes once with a ranked choice ballot. Pages 33 and 45 show two common, simple ballots.  A workshop page demonstrates a Condorcet Tally table. And a simulation map illustrates Condorcet voters with two issue dimensions.  *People often struggle to find  a group’s* ***center*** *of opinion*    K is nearest four voters. L is nearest five voters.  28 | |  | | --- | | The winner had no surplus.  The last loser held four votes. | | How many votes were wasted on a surplus or a loser?  M, L & V rank Celia #1.D, Z & C rank Diana #1.   |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | | **Celia** **IRV Winner** |  | **Diana** **Runner up** |   *Finish Line\_\_Finish Line\_\_Finish*   |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | | B B |  |  | |  |  |  | | J J |  | G G | |  |  |  | | M M |  | D D | |  |  |  | | L L |  | Z Z | |  |  |  | | V V |  | C C |   *This winner had no surplus.* *The last loser held 4 votes.* |  |
|  | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **1. Ranked Choice Voting to Elect One**  Tabletop tallies make Ranked Choice Voting lively.  This finish line is the height of half the cards, plus one. That is how many votes a candidate needs to win.  If no one wins, we **eliminate** the weakest candidate. We draw names from a hat to break ties.  If your favorite loses, you can **move** your card.  You can give it to your next backup choice.  We repeat this to eliminate all but one, the winner*!*  This **chart** shows four columns on a tally board. The tally **eliminated** Anna, so **voter** **JJ** **moved** his card.Then Bianca lost, so **BB** and **GG** moved their cards.  They were free to choose different backups.1   |  |  |  | | --- | --- | --- | | **Anna** **Eliminated 1st** |  | **Bianca** **Dropped 2nd** | |  |  | B B | |  |  |  | | J J |  | G G |   40 JJ ranks Anna 1, Celia 2. GG ranks Bianca 1, Diana 2. | |  | **Condorcet** Test Number Three  Candidate L wins her last test by six to three. 6 > 3 She has won a majority over each rival.  This makes her the “**Condorcet winner**.”  L   K M  “...such a mandate is no doubt a vital  ingredient in the subsequent career of the winner.” 1  .see page 15.  Thus a Condorcet Tally picks a central winner.  It can elect a **moderator** to a council, see page 8, or moderate district reps for MMP, see page 17. or senators to make an upper house. But is it likely to elect diverse reps, yes or no? It can select the base number for **FSV**, see page 26, or one plan for all the ongoing budgets, see page 44. But is it likely to spread spending fairly, yes or no? Who is the Condorcet winner on page 13? Do CEOs mostly **moderate** or **advocate**, *e.g.* a mayor?    L has six votes. M has three.  *Answers: No. No. L. Discuss this.* 29 |  |
|  | The goal in a **Condorcet Tally** is this:  **Win majority victories over every single rival.**       The winner must top every rival, **one-against-one**.  A good **analogy** is a round-robin tournament.  A player has one test with each rival, one at a time.  If she wins all her tests, she wins the tournament.  Each voting test sorts all the ballots into two piles.  If you rank option K above L, your ballot goes to K.  The option that gets the most ballots wins this test.  If one wins all its tests, it wins the Condorcet Tally.\*  **Why Use a Condorcet Tally (CT)**  **Choice** **ballots:** Rank the alternatives on one ballot so **Simplify** the old rules of order, **speed up** the process and **Reduce agenda effects**, from simple errors and **gridlock**, to free-rider and wrecking amendments.\*  **No split-vote** worries as duplicates don't help or hurt each other. An ad hoc majority can rank all of their favorites over the other options. Ballots from all voters help decide which one of the majority’s favorites wins.  **A balanced policy** tends to be **stable**, thus decisive. Yet, **a balanced process** can **calm** some fears about reviewing and **changing** a good policy to improve it. This saves time and builds respect for democracy.  \* In one tally, majorities could  rank K > L, L > M, *and* M > K.  RCV can break this unusual tie. 2  K L  **⭮**  M  30 \* The glossary is on page 68. |  | B. Workshop Games  Rule_Board_500  **Get your hands on 4 great voting rules.**  **See how fair share tallies organize voters.**  **Vote fast on projects, reps, or policies.**  Imag0019 h sized A tally board has **Bunting1RB a card for each voter,**  **Bunting1RB a column for each option,**  **Bunting1RB** **a finish line for the favorites.**  39 |  |
|  | How You Can Try a Voting Tool  It's easy to **test**-drive a decision tool in a survey. Or  a council can form a committee of the whole to discuss, vote, tally and report results to enact by its old rules.  Many groups **adopt** a book of parliamentary rules; then they amend it with “special rules of order” to make their decisions more popular, stable and quick.4  A_oldsteam A_mercedes  Steering Analogy  When choosing a voting rule, a new Mercedes **costs** little more than an old jalopy. That price is a bargain when the votes steer important budgets or policies.  Does your car have an 1890 steering tiller or a **new**, power steering wheel? Does your town have an 1890 voting rule or a new, centrally balanced rule? page 33.   Some groups offer **apps to tally your votes.**  https://AccurateDemocracy.com/z\_tools.htm  38 |  | **Achieve Policies with Wider Appeal**  A **plurality** or runoff winner gets no votes from the losing side and doesn't need to please those voters. But each **CT** option needs support from all sides, because every voter can rank it against its close rivals.  Thus every CT voter is “obtainable” and valuable.  So the winner is well balanced and widely popular.2, 3  Voters on the center and right give it a majority over any left-wing policy. At the same time, voters on the left and center like it more than any right-wing policy. All sides like it more than a narrowly-centrist policy.  pw Blur USM 600 “Our center  is near me.”  “I think it's  over here.”  “I *am* the  center*!"*  **✓** Everyone may help to find our center.  A Chair with Balanced Support  **CT can elect a chairperson or a few reps** to be the **swing voters** in an **Ensemble** **Council**, as pictured on pages 8 and 54-55. To win, a candidate needs to earn wide support. This gives her strong incentives to help the council balance its process and policies.  **RCV** has slightly different effects, incentives and uses.3 Games will let us play inside each tally to feel how it works.  31 |  |
|  | Resist Rigged Votes  In the **plurality** **election** on page 11 candidate M lost. Let's say her party **gerrymanders** the borders of her election district. It adds a voter, pictured here in purple,  who likes the party and cuts out some who don’t like it.  In this **safe-seat** district, bluish voters can elect M or an even less central person who may **polarize** politics.4  But this gerrymander didn’t change the **CT** winner, L.  So policies stay stable and take big swerves less often.    3 rank K>L>M. 2 rank L>M>K. 4 rank M>L>K.  To steal a one-seat district that uses CT or RCV, $ponsors must **mislead** a majority, not just a plurality.  And help to "**spoilers**" in a rival group fails to split it.  **Gerrymanders** tend to make lots of **wasted votes**.5 **Proportional RCV** cuts down reduces both, as we’ve shown on page 21.  Foul **manipulations** of plurality rules are not rare.  And point voting incites *extremist* high and low votes, asso, many voters  I worry, “Could my points for a low choice hurt my fave?” But a chance to rig real **RCV** or **Condorcet/RCV** voting is rare, risky and hard. So there’s less danger of rigged votes.2  32 | |  | | Complementing Consensus  Groups that seek consensus on basic agreements may vote on other issues: They may vote on a minor **detail** like a paint color or on a list of optional **projects**.  **Fair Share Voting gives fair shares of power.**  Inclusive yet fast, it won't let one person block action.  It is cooperative, not consensual nor adversarial. It is less about blocking rivals, more about attracting allies. Its ballot guides a voter to limit and prioritize projects. Its tally finds the collective priorities for the intersecting interest groups. We may modify our FSV results through our usual process.  **All majorities prefer the Condorcet winner**.  A proposal needs to top each rival by 50% plus one; and we may require it to win 60% or even 100% over the status quo on issues involving our basic agreements. If so, 41%, or even one voter, may block a Condorcet winner by convincing us it breaks a basic agreement.  Appropriate, principled, valid, or legitimate blocks.  Carpentry Analogy  The nice consensus methods are like nice hand tools, and these nice voting methods are like nice power tools. The power tools speed cutting through piles of boards or issues, and cutting through a steel-hard one. The hand tools help us discover and develop insights into new options.3 So most of us want both kinds of tools.  This primer told the *stories* of the best voting tools. The games will let take us *be inside* the simple tallies. 🡺 ➲  37 |  |
|  | Consensus and Voting  Group decision-making has two linked processes:  1) A **discussion** **process** might have a facilitator, an agenda, some reports and proposals. Each participant  may ask for info or to add or alter proposals. This process might close key options before the decision process. page 33 alternatives available  2) A **decision** **process** asks the members concerned, "Which proposals have enough support to be winners?"2  Voting only **yes or no** leads us to discuss and decide *one* formal “motion” at a time in a very strict sequence. It stifles the sharing of ideas and development of plans.  But both **consensus** and **ranked choice** **ballots** let us decide some closely-related options at the same time. Both reward blending compatible ideas, pages 9, 31 and polarize us less than yes-or-no voting. " 14, 46, 56  So more members want to help carry out the decision soon and make it work; fewer try to block or slow it us down.  brakes up polarized choices by allowing middle ground And both reward blending compatible ideas. pages 9, 31 They are less divisive than yes-or-no voting. '' 14, 46, 56.  "If you want democracy to be =, you have to make it undemanding."Kevin J. Elliot of Yale. youtu.be/0C6VXDxIoEk?list=PLiE\_UoMd\_0USNi1SagBYbQUwXRMgxlaJ2&t=765.  Why Take a Vote  Discussing an issue well often resolves most parts, with mandates up to 100%. unanimity Yet we might want to decide some parts with the best voting tools. Why?  The best rules *strengthen* some reasons for voting:  Choice ballots can **speed up meetings**. pages 27, 33  Secret ballots **reduce social pressure** and coercion.  Well-designed ballots and tallies **promote equality**: Even busy or unassertive people can cast full votes.  36 |  | A Less Rigged Agenda *Now!*  Some meetings concoct a policy by a series of yes-no choices, with or without rules of order, agendas or votes. An early proposal might have to beat each later one. An early decision might preclude some later proposals. So “**stacking the agenda**” can help some and hurt other proposals.  Other meetings discuss the rival options all at once. But often, many members express **no backup choices**. So similar options split supporters and hurt each other. Then a minority pushing one option might seem to be the strongest group. Even sadder, a member with a well-balanced option but few eager supporters might drop it.  Too often, a committee chooses all the parts in a bill. Other members can say only yes or no to that **bundle**. It might include free-rider or wrecking amendments.  **Rigged votes** often build a bad policy and animosity. To reduce these risks, let the members safely rank the more options. Open Ballots may still be used.\*\*.6  Issue A, Ranked Choice Ballot *New Use!*  **Rank Option**    3  Continue discussion    2  Original bill, the main motion    1  Bill with Amendment 1 (a free rider?)    8  Bill with Amend. 2 (a wrecking amend.?)    7  Bill with Amendments 1 and 2    4  Postpone to a definite time   7 days    5  Refer the bill to a committee    6  No change (a vote for gridlock exposed?)  Any “Incidental Motions” do not wait for the ballot.  These include a personal complaint or request. 33 |  | |
|  | Summary and Index of Benefits  **Ranked Choice Voting has proven to:** Pages  1, 2, 3, 4. **Make voting easy** and more effective. **14**, 57 Give you power to rank a backup choice; so∴ 33, 45 Reduce your risk of wasting your vote; so ∴ 12, 16 Vote worry free for your true first choice. 14 **Boost mandates as more voters count.** **11**-21, 57  1, 2. **Reduce** **attack ads** that scare, anger and polarize. 14 **Weaken** **gerrymanders** and spoilers. 14, 21, 32  2. **Give** **fair shares** of reps to the rival groups; so **16** Give diverse candidates real chances to win; so 18 Give voters real choices and effective votes; so 17 **Make voter** turnout **stronger.** 61  2. **Elect women** about twice as often as plurality; so **18** Accurate majorities win– also due to more: choices, 17 turnout, effective votes and equal votes per rep; so 19 **Make policies match public opinion better.** 19, 60  Even then, old decision tools push policy pendulums. 4  ✧🟑 **First Spark to Highest Emotion An RCV Toolbox can do more** ❀ ♥  4. **Elect a few central reps**, the keystone votes pulling 30-**31**,56 reps from many factions **to** **moderate policies**. 8, 54  3. **Give** Fair Share Voting for projects, savings, etc. **24** **Reveal spending** by each rep; **cut corruption**. 27, **59**  3, 4. **Reduce** **agenda effects** and scams. 27, 30, **33**, 36 **Streamline group decision making.** 27, 33, 36  34 | |  | | ♥   Social Effects ♥  Tools that Shape Communities Promote Coop  A group’s decision rules pull its **culture** toward fair shares *or* toward winner takes all. They spread power wide and balanced, *or* narrow and lopsided. Other relations among members may follow their models.  Fair rules make **cooperation** safer, faster and easier. This favors people and groups who tend to cooperate. It may lead others to cooperate more often. 🖝✌👍🖏  Earthball Rect_2  Politics are more **principled** and peaceful when all our rules help us find fair shares and central majorities. This might reduce political fears within our community; which helps us to be more receptive, creative and free.  Better tally rules can help us build better decisions, plus better **relationships**. Both can please most people. Fair rules won’t please some who get money or self-esteem from war-like politics. But countries with fair rules tend to rank high in social trust and happiness1.  35 |  |

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