Loring One-winner Rule罗林一个冠军细则

Instant Runoff Voting Resists Manipulation即时径流操纵投票光刻胶

“The most striking result is the difference between the manipulability of the Hare [ IRV ] system and the other systems.  Because the [IRV] system considers only 'current' first preferences, it appears to be extremely difficult to manipulate.  To be successful, a coalition must usually throw enough support to losing candidates to eliminate the sincere winner (the winner when no preferences are misrepresented) at an early stage, but still leave an agreed upon candidate with sufficient first-place strength to win.  This turns out to be quite difficult to do.”  Chamberlin, Cohen and Coombs (Ref C ) “最引人注目的结果之间的区别是可操作性的野兔[ 通气 ]系统和其他系统。由于[通气]系统只考虑当前的'第一次优惠，这似乎是非常困难的操纵。要取得成功，联盟通常必须抛出足够的支持的候选人，以消除失去的真诚冠军（冠军时，没有偏好歪曲）在早期阶段，但仍留下一个商定的候选人有足够的第一名实力取胜。这原来是相当困难的事情。 “张伯伦，科恩和库姆斯（编号ç ）

As they imply, first preference is the rank most likely to be sincere on a ballot.  It is hard to convince voters they will get a better result by lying about their first preferences.  Merrill reports that findings by Tideman agree with these and states, “Indeed, since the Hare [IRV] system appears very difficult to manipulate, strategic voting tends to be identical with sincere voting...” (Ref M )因为它们意味着，第一选择是排名最有可能成为真诚的选票上。这是很难说服选民，他们将会得到一个更好的结果撒谎首次优惠。美林报告说，调查结果泰德曼同意这些和国家， “事实上，自从兔[通气]系统似乎很难操纵性，战略性投票往往是相同的，真诚投票... “ （编号M ）

But the same researchers also found IRV poor at electing the most central option; it is often encircled by rivals, gets few first-rank votes, and is eliminated in an early round of ballot counting.但是，同样的研究人员还发现通气穷人选出最核心的选择，它往往是包围对手，获得一些第一级票，并取消早日轮计票。 [Hare's rule is often called Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) in the USA, Alternative Vote (AV) in Australia, and Preference Vote or Single Transferable Vote (STV1) in Europe.] [兔的规则往往被称为即时径流投票（通气）在美国，替代票（视听）在澳大利亚，和偏好投票或单让渡投票（ STV1 ）在欧洲。 ]

Enacting the majority policy, the Condorcet winner, is a key criterion for measuring democracy.  IRV fails in simulated elections less often than plurality rule but more often than Borda and some others.  However, Borda and other rules often reward manipulation by strategic voting and so encourage it.  As a result, they might not even start with the sincere ballots needed to find a majority policy.  Finding the best policy is the primary reason to block manipulations.  Increasing trust is a deeper benefit.颁布的大多数政策，孔赢家，是一个关键的标准来衡量民主。通气失败模拟选举较少，但比多数规则往往博尔达和一些其他国家。然而，博尔达和其他规则往往奖励操纵投票，因此战略鼓励它。因此，他们可能甚至没有开始，真诚的选票需要寻找一种多数的政策。寻找最佳政策是主要的原因阻止操纵。增加信任是一个更深的利益。  

Condorcet + IRV, the Best of Both ?孔+通气，两个方面的最佳？

Loring One-winner Rule ( LOR ) for legislative voting builds on Hill's rule.  It elects the Condorcet winner if there is one.  If there is none, LOR finds the罗林一个冠军第（ 耳鼻喉科 ）立法投票的基础上希尔的规则。孔它选出的冠军，如果有一个。如果没有，耳鼻喉科认定 IRV winner and the chairperson's favorite; then tallies a runoff between these two.通气冠军和主席的喜爱;然后统计过半多数的选票，这两者之间。

All 4 tallies: Condorcet's rule, IRV, the chair's tie-breaker or another completion rule, and the final runoff, all are tallied from the preference ballots.  Each rep casts 1 ballot and the series of tallies is automatic.全部4计：孔的规则，通气，主席的抢七或另一完成规则，最后径流，都达到了优惠票。每个代表投下1投票和一系列的统计是自动的。

The only way to manipulate Condorcet's rule is to create a sort of tie -- a "voting cycle" in which no option can win majorities over every single rival.  IRV is manipulable rarely.  The chairperson's ballot and the 1 against 1 runoff are not manipulable.只有这样，才能操作孔的规则是要创造一种配合-这是一种“选举周期”中，没有其他选择，可以赢得多数超过每一个对手。通气是操作很少。主席的选票和1票反对1径流不操作。

If the majority option is in the final runoff, it will win.  For LOR to fail, Condorcet, IRV, and the chair all must fail to find the central option.  Of course, they could fail simultaneously.  But the chance of that is less than the chance of failure for the best element of LOR.如果大多数选择是在最后的径流，它将获胜。对于耳鼻喉科失败，孔，通气，和主席都必须未能找到中央选择。当然，他们可能会失败同时进行。但是，机会是少比失败的机会的最佳元素耳鼻喉科。

The need to create a voting cycle may make LOR even harder to manipulate than IRV.  Creating a cycle sometimes requires more conspirators than a manipulation of IRV does.  Thus LOR often increases the number of reps who must be organized into a conspiracy.有必要建立一个投票周期可耳鼻喉科更难操纵比通气。创建一个周期有时需要更多的阴谋操纵比不通气。因此耳鼻喉科往往增加了一些代表谁必须成为一个有组织的阴谋。

In order to manipulate LOR, a group must 1) create a voting cycle and either 2a) manipulate IRV, or 2b) chance upon a case in which IRV does not enact the Condorcet winner.  Thus LOR could be easier to manipulate than IRV only in 2b, when IRV fails to enact the policy preferred by a majority.为了操纵耳鼻喉科，一群必须1 ）创建一个投票周期要么2A ）款的操纵通气，或2b干扰素）的机会后，案中通气不颁布孔赢家。因此耳鼻喉科可更容易操作只能在较通气2b干扰素，当通气失败颁布的政策倾向于大多数。

3) In addition, LOR calls for a final 1 against 1 test if IRV and the chairperson disagree.  This runoff step increases the risks for strategic voters.  When the true Condorcet winner is 1 of the 2 finalists, a crossover strategy will give the manipulators a result no better than the Condorcet winner. 3 ）此外，耳鼻喉科要求最后1对1测试是否通气和主席不同意。这一步径流增加的风险战略选民。当真正的赢家是1孔的2决赛，交叉战略将使机器人由于没有更好的比孔赢家。 (In B versus C, C wins.  In D versus C, D wins and the conspirators get a result they like less than the Condorcet winner, C.) （在B相的C ， C胜。在D相的C ， D胜阴谋得到结果不到他们喜欢的孔冠军，角）

When there is no Condorcet winner, LOR picks from the voting cycle both the IRV winner, because that is the hardest rule to manipulate; and the option ranked highest by the chairperson, because she has the least incentive to create a cycle.如果没有孔冠军，耳鼻喉科选投票周期从两个通气赢家，因为这是最难的规则来操作，并选择排名最高的主席，因为她已经是最不激励创造一个周期。 (The chair's ballot or the IRV tally or both may be replaced by hard-to-manipulate rules such as those by Tideman's Ranked Pairs or Schulze's Beat Path .) （椅子的选票或通气吻合或双方均可改为难以操纵的规则，如由泰德曼的排行双或舒尔茨的禁毒之路。 ）

LOR is fine for a large legislature, but it might be too easily manipulated in a small one or one with a few well-disciplined factions.  In those cases, Ranked Pairs or Beat Path.  Condorcet-completion rules are probably better.  They may be used in conjunction with the chair's favorite and a runoff if there is no Condorcet winner.耳鼻喉科的罚款，一个大型的立法机关，但也可能是太容易被操纵的一个小一个或一个少数纪律严明派别。在这些案件中，被评为双或殴打路径。孔完成规则可能是更好的。他们可能被配合主席的喜爱和径流如果没有孔赢家。

Procedural Rules程序规则

Those completion rules are very good -- so further reducing opportunities for manipulation, its ease and safety, are very tough goals.  Another way to improve legislative voting is by procedural rules .  Here is 1 such rule.完成这些规则非常好-这样的机会进一步减少操纵，其方便和安全，是非常艰难的目标。另一种方法是改进立法表决的程序规则 。这里是1这种规则。

Strategic voting often gives the strategists a risk of enacting a policy that they would like less than the winner from their sincere voting.  That is the aim of this procedural rule, to increase that risk and so deter attempts:战略投票往往使战略家的风险颁布一项政策，他们希望不到致胜的真诚表决。这就是这样做的目的的程序规则，以增加这种危险，因此阻止企图：

Anyone who ranked the runoff winner over the loser may move to change that vote.  Other reps may change their votes also at that time.  This motion to " Recall the Question " returns only to the runoff stage.任何谁排名径流战胜失败者可能会改变这一表决。其他代表可能会改变他们的投票在那个时候还。这项议案，以“ 召回问题 ”只会传回的径流阶段。

(Voters might ask for endless minor revisions if they were allowed to return to the full rank ballot.  That also could increase information available for manipulation and counter-manipulation.) （选民可能会问的无休止的小的修改，如果允许他们返回满秩投票。这也可以增加信息的操纵与反操纵。 ）

Reps might change their runoff votes if they see in the ballots a likely manipulation such as voters "crossing over" the center to support an opposing policy (which had no chance of winning).  That can create a voting cycle if the opposing policy beats the most central policy.  Such ballots may be obvious.  If so, re-voting gives the majority a chance to punish the schemers by enacting the crossover item.代表可能会改变其径流票，如果他们看到的票数可能操纵，如选民“跨越”的中心，以支持对方的政策（这并没有夺冠的机会） 。这可以创建一个投票周期如果对方的政策打破了最核心的政策。投票可能是显而易见的。如果是这样，重新给出了多数表决的机会，惩治阴谋颁布的交叉项目。

Footnotes: 注 ：

About research on manipulation: Using preference ballots from a large association's presidential elections, with 5 candidates in each, University of Michigan Professors Chamberlin, Cohen, and Coombs researched how often 9 voting systems were manipulable and how easy the manipulations were.  The rules were plurality, Borda, Hare (IRV), Coombs, approve 2, approve 3, and the Condorcet completion rules Kemeny, Min-max, and Black's (Condorcet then Borda).  The other rules were manipulable in all 10 tests, but IRV was manipulable in only 1.  Truncated ballots with some options unranked were not allowed. 关于研究处理 ：使用优惠票从一个大型协会的总统选举， 5名候选人中，每个美国密西根大学教授张伯伦，科恩和库姆斯研究多久 9投票系统操作和多么容易的操纵了。多元化的规则，博尔达，野兔（通气） ，库姆斯，核准2 ，核准3 ，孔完成规则凯梅尼，最小最大，黑色的（孔然后博尔达） 。其他规则来操作的所有10个试验，但操作中通气是只有1 。截断票数便陷入困境的一些办法是不允许的。

Virginia Polytechnic Institute Professor Nicolaus Tideman found similar patterns and conclusions using preference ballots from 87 medium-sized, multi-winner elections, .弗吉尼亚理工学院教授尼古拉泰德曼发现类似的模式和结论使用偏好选票来自87个中型，多赢得选举。 “the alternative vote is quite resistant to strategy” and “the fact that in 87 elections in the sample there were just three in which there was a dominant option [Condorcet winner] that was not chosen is somewhat reassuring.” “替代投票很耐战略”和“一个事实，即在87个样品中选举有三个，其中有一个主要的选择[孔得主]这是没有选择有点让人放心。 ”
(Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice, Ashgate Publishing, 2006, pgs. 194-195). （集体的决定和投票：潜在的公共选择，阿什盖特出版， 2006年，素。 194-195 ） 。

In The Burr Dilemma in Approval Voting (Journal of Politics, February 2007, pgs. 35-36), University of Pennsylvania's Jack H. Nagel explains why non-monotonicity is not a serious flaw for IRV (which he calls alternative vote):在困境中毛刺审批表决（政治学杂志， 2007年2月，素。 35-36 ） ，宾夕法尼亚大学的杰克阁下纳格尔解释为什么非单调性不是一个严重的漏洞的通气（他称之为替代表决） ：

[Exploitating non-monotonicity]...is indeed possible under the alternative vote, but the conditions it requires are extraordinarily restrictive.... [ Exploitating非单调性] ...的确是可能的替代性投票，但它需要的条件是非常严格的.... Note that the kind of strategic voting required to exploit non-monotonicity under the alternative vote demands far more of voters (and organizers) than its counterpart under approval voting.请注意，什么样的战略投票需要利用非单调性的替代性的要求远远投票的选民（和组织者）比其对应的批准下投票。 The approval voter who truncates nevertheless votes quite sincerely for his first choice, whereas the alternative-vote manipulator must put her last choice first.谁批准截断然而选民投票十分真诚，他的第一选择，而替代票机器人必须把她的最后选择第一。 Moreover, under approval voting, the act of truncating in itself does not hurt the voter's favorite (although a resulting retaliatory spiral might), whereas the number of insincere voters under the alternative vote must be precisely calculated and controlled, or else the manipulators risk eliminating their favorite.此外，根据投票批准，该法的截断本身并不伤害了选民最喜欢的（虽然可能会造成报复性螺旋） ，而一些言不由衷的选民投票的替代必须精确计算和控制，否则机器人风险消除他们最喜欢的。 These drawbacks may make strategic voting under the alternative vote less benign - when and if it occurs; but they also make it, I suggest, far les probable than truncation under approval voting.这些缺点可能会做出战略性的选择投票表决减少良性-不过，如果它发生，但他们也使我认为，法国可能远远超过截断下批准投票。

Unfortunately, no one has compared rules on the frequency of legislative electorates (simulated or actual) manipulable by [10]% of voters; the average size of conspiracy needed; the amount of information conspirators need on other rep's choices; and the risk of adverse outcomes (results worse than sincere ballots).不幸的是，没有一个比较规则的频率立法选民（模拟或实际）操作的[ 10 ] ％的选民;的平均规模阴谋需要;的信息量阴谋需要对其他代表的选择和不利的风险结果（结果不如真诚选票） 。

Concocted examples prove a possibility, not a probability.  They are no more true to life than cooked data in an ecology field study.  We know every voting rule can be manipulated.  The question then is, "Can some be manipulated more often or more easily than others?"炮制的例子证明的可能性，而不是概率。他们没有更多的真实生活中的数据比煮熟生态领域的研究。我们知道，每一个投票规则可以操纵。接下来的问题是， “一些人操纵，能更经常地或更容易比别人？ “ The answer is found by statistical simulations and polling data, not by creating data to fit conclusions.  Chamberlin and others found that both sources of data showed that IRV is the least manipulable rule for large electorates.答案是发现了模拟和投票站的统计数据，而不是通过建立数据，以满足的结论。张伯伦和其他发现，这两个来源的数据表明，通气是最操作规则的大型选民。

About elections: This page presents a completion rule for policy decisions by groups of 5 to 500.  Strategic voting is expected here.  But in large elections, accidental voting cycles are likely to be more common than successful manipulations.  Simulations can compare completion rules by the "utility value" of their results in voting cycles, which is a measure of how close to the electorate's center a rule's winning option is.  By that criterion, LOR rates below some other completion rules such as Black's combination of Condorcet and Borda.  Black's rule may be better for large elections even though it is easy and tempting to manipulate it. 关于选举 ：在此页中完成规则的决策群体的5至500人。战略表决预计这里。但在大型选举中，意外投票周期很可能是较常见的比成功的操纵。模拟可以比较规则的完成“实用价值”的结果，参加表决的周期，这是衡量接近选民的中心规则的获奖选项。通过这一标准，耳鼻喉科率低于其他一些完成规则，如黑色的结合孔和博尔达。黑色的统治可能是更好的大型选举，即使是很容易和诱人的操纵它。

Multi-winner STV is even tougher to manipulate than one-winner IRV.  Encouraging options which are similar to a projected winner can reduce its 1st preferences and lead to its elimination, but 1 of the clones will still win.  Condorcet's rule defeats that squeeze strategy and also reduces the free ride incentive in multi-winner elections.多冠军基金会还是更严厉的操纵多个得主通气。鼓励办法是类似预测冠军可以减少第1优惠，并导致其消除，但1的克隆仍将获胜。孔统治失败的挤压战略也降低了免费乘车的奖励多赢得选举。 ] ]

Experimental variations on LOR will be shown in l_lor_1.htm .  All Loring rules use Condorcet's rule followed by STV.实验变化对耳鼻喉科将显示在l_lor_1.htm 。所有罗林规则使用孔的统治之后，超视。

Most formal and informal meetings follow an elimination path similar to STV.  Thus, like STV, they risk missing the most central option.  The next page briefly describes some other rules for setting policies.最正式和非正式会议的后续取消类似超视道路。因此，像超视，他们的风险失踪最核心的选择。下一页简要介绍了一些其他规则制定的政策。