Accurate Democracy 准确的民主 
Central Chairperson. 中央主席 。 
Data 数据 print. translate. 打印 。转化。
| Accurate Democracy 准确的民主 | Election Systems. 选举制度 。 Central Chairperson. 中央主席 。 Data 数据 print. translate. 打印 。转化。 |
 | Data on One-Winner数据的一个胜利者 | |
Condorcet Efficiency 孔效率Even though Condorcet winners can beat each of the other candidates in one-on-one elections, most voting rules do not always elect them.尽管孔优胜者可以打败每个其他候选人在一对一的选举，大多数投票规则并不总是选举他们。 Given 100 elections with no voting cycles, what percentage of the 100 Condorcet winners will each voting system elect?鉴于100选举没有投票周期，有多大比例的100孔优胜者将每个投票制度选举？ This number is a voting system's "Condorcet efficiency".这个数字是一个投票系统的“孔效率” 。 To estimate the efficiency of each voting system, several political scientists have used computers to simulate groups of voters.估计效率的每个投票制度，一些政治科学家利用电脑模拟团体选民。[Samuel Merrill III coined this term and defined it: "The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the proportion or percentage of a class of elections (for which a Condorcet candidate exists) in which the voting system chooses the Condorcet candidate as winner." [塞缪尔美林三杜撰这一术语和定义的那样： “孔效率的表决程序的比例或百分比的一类选举（一孔为候选人存在） ，其中表决制度选择孔候选人获胜。 ” ( Merrill : Glossary)] （ 美林 ：词汇表） ] |
21 Voters 21投票
| Voting投票 system系统 | Impartial公正 culture文化 | Candidate 候选人 Low低的 | Dispersion 色散 Medium中等 | High高的 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coombs库姆斯 Borda博尔达 Hare (IRV)黑尔（通气） Plurality多元化 | 93 93 86 86 92 92 69 69 | 96 96 83 83 72 72 59 59 | 98 98 83 83 75 75 53 53 | 99 99 92 92 90 90 77 77 |
1000 Voters 1000年选民
| Voting投票 system系统 | Impartial公正 culture文化 | Candidate 候选人 Low低的 | Dispersion 色散 Medium中等 | High高的 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Coombs库姆斯 Borda博尔达 Hare (IRV)黑尔（通气） Plurality多元化 | 91 91 89 89 92 92 69 69 | 81 81 85 85 32 32 27 27 | 99 99 86 86 60 60 33 33 | 99 99 97 97 84 84 70 70 |
Table 2. 表2 。 Condorcet Efficiencies 孔效率
in computer simulated elections with 5 candidates and 1000 voters在计算机模拟的选举， 5名候选人和1000年的选民
from Merrill , 1988, page 24从美林 ， 1988年，第24页
| Dispersion = 0.5色散= 0.5 | Dispersion = 1.0色散= 1.0 | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C = 0.5 ç = 0.5 | C = 0.0 ç = 0.0 | C = 0.5 ç = 0.5 | C = 0.0 ç = 0.0 | ||||||
| Voting投票 system系统 | Random随机 society社会 | D=2 D = 2 | D=4 D = 4 | D=2 D = 2 | D=4 D = 4 | D=2 D = 2 | D=4 D = 4 | D=2 D = 2 | D=4 D = 4 |
| Plurality多元化 Runoff径流 Hare (IRV)黑尔（通气） Approval批准 | 60 60 82 82 88 88 67 67 | 21 21 31 31 34 34 73 73 | 28 28 44 44 50 50 76 76 | 27 27 39 39 38 38 75 75 | 42 42 62 62 72 72 82 82 | 57 57 80 80 78 78 74 74 | 67 67 87 87 86 86 78 78 | 61 61 79 79 83 83 81 81 | 81 81 96 96 97 97 84 84 |
| Borda博尔达 Coombs库姆斯 Black (Con)黑（节能） Utility max.效用最大。 | 85 85 90 90 100 100 78 78 | 84 84 90 90 100 100 80 80 | 87 87 91 91 100 100 85 85 | 86 86 90 90 100 100 83 83 | 88 88 94 94 100 100 86 86 | 86 86 97 97 100 100 83 83 | 89 89 97 97 100 100 88 88 | 89 89 95 95 100 100 88 88 | 92 92 97 97 100 100 90 90 |
| | 76 76 | 98 98 | 98 98 | 98 98 | 99 99 | 99+ 99 + | 99 99 | 99+ 99 + | 99+ 99 + |
" Spatial model " refers to simulations with a bell-curved distribution of voters on each issue. “ 空间模型 ”是指模拟与贝尔弯的选民分布在每一个问题。 A " dispersion " of 1.0 (or medium) means the average distance between candidates' opinions is as wide as the average distance between voters' opinions; 0.5 means the candidates tend to be more moderate than the voters.一个“ 散 ”的1.0 （或中等）指候选人之间的平均距离的意见是宽的平均距离选民之间的意见; 0.5指候选人往往更加温和的选民。 The latter corresponds to the assumption that most candidates seek the large group of voters in the middle of the bell curve.后者相当于假定最候选人寻求大集团的选民中的钟形曲线。 Low dispersion = 0.4 and high = 1.5.低色散= 0.4和高= 1.5 。 C = 0.5 means there is some correspondence between a voter's position on one issue and his position on others; C = 0.0 means there is no relationship between issues. ç = 0.5是有对应关系的选民问题上的立场和他的一个问题上的立场等; ç = 0.0是指没有关系的问题。 Plurality has the worst scores.多元化最差成绩。 Runoff and IRV also do poorly in some situations.径流和通气也很差，在某些情况下。 Often IRV's flaw results from the squeeze effect.经常通气的缺陷结果挤压效应。 The Condorcet-completion rules by Black, Copeland, Dodgson, Kemeny, Schulze, Tideman and others have Condorcet efficiencies of 100% as does LOR which elects the Condorcet winner when there is one else the IRV winner.该孔完成规则的黑色，科普兰，格森，凯梅尼，舒尔茨， 泰德曼孔和其他有效率100 ％一样耳鼻喉科的选举孔冠军当有其他人的通气赢家。 Manipulation of any rule can hide Condorcet winners.操纵任何规则可以隐藏孔赢家。 A rule's resistance to manipulation is a key to its Condorcet efficiency in policy votes.规则的抗操纵是一个关键的孔效率政策票。 Merrill explores Condorcet efficiencies in more complex situations (Merrill, page 39).美林探讨孔效率更为复杂的情况 （美林，第39页） 。 IRV's chance of electing the Condorcet candidate drops in a polarized society.通气的机会选举候选人孔下降两极分化的社会。 Its efficiency rises with rising voter uncertainty about candidates' positions on issues but it remains lower than most other rule's.其效率的提高不断增加的选民不确定性候选人问题上的立场，但仍然低于其他大多数规则的。 The efficiency of IRV and other non-Condorcet rules drops as the number of candidates increases.通气的效率和其他非规则滴孔作为候选人人数增加。 Obviously, the elections in which IRV picks the Condorcet winner are a subset of those in which LOR does.显然，在选举中的孔通气选冠军的一个子集，那些耳鼻喉科没有。 voter uncertainty, pre-election polls and "strategic voting" in which each person uses polling information, optimizing his ballot to elect candidates he likes and block those he dislikes.选民的不确定性，选举前的民意调查和“战略投票”中，每个人使用投票站信息，优化了投票选举的候选人，他喜欢和阻止那些他不喜欢。 Surveys and actual elections reveal some randomness, some clusters of like-minded voters and some agreement on the candidates' relative positions left to right.调查和实际选举揭示一些随机性，一些集群志同道合的选民和一些协议，候选人的相对位置左至右。 A mixture of random and a normally-distributed voters approximates the observed patterns.混合物的随机和通常分布选民接近观察模式。 But just as random and spatial models lead to different results, so the actual data differs from both of them.但正如随机和空间模式导致不同的结果，因此实际数据不同于二者。 Tideman reportedly found that even plurality rule picked the Condorcet winner in 95% of three-candidate elections.泰德曼报发现，即使多元化规则挑选孔比赛中， 95 ％的三个候选人的选举。 He used survey data to simulate rank-order ballots.他用调查数据来模拟排名顺序投票。 (Merrill, page 70) This does not recommend plurality since its efficiency drops as the number of contestants rises and all other systems scored higher. （美林，第70页）这并不建议多元化，因为其效率下降的数量上升参赛者和所有其他系统的得分更高。 Chamberlin and Featherston found similar results when they simulated ballots to resemble the distribution and clustering they found in the APA electorate.张伯伦和Featherston发现类似的结果时，模拟投票，以类似的分布和集群，他们发现在亚太选民。 So the pattern of opinion dispersion affects Condorcet efficiencies.因此，舆论的模式色散影响孔效率。 But the relative standing of the voting systems does not change.但相对常规的投票制度不会改变。 Condorcet efficiency has great importance because they tend to be the median candidates and a happy result for the greatest number of voters.孔效率非常重要，因为他们往往是中间的候选人和一个愉快的结果尽可能多的选民。 This is not necessarily the greatest total happiness as utility voting systems attempt to define it.这不一定是最大的幸福作为公用事业总投票系统试图确定它。
Utility efficiency 综合利用效率The major competitor to Condorcet efficiency is utility efficiency.主要竞争对手孔效率的综合利用效率。 It attempts to measure how likely a voting system is to elect the candidate with supporters who feel strongly and opponents who don't much care.它试图衡量选举制度可能是选举的候选人谁强烈支持者和反对者谁不多少照顾。 Many people are skeptical about trying to compare utility values from one voter to another and to hundreds of voters; so Condorcet efficiency remains the most widely accepted measure.许多人都持怀疑态度试图比较实用价值从一个选民到另一个和数以百计的选民，所以孔效率仍然是最广泛接受的措施。[footnote 1: Researchers attempt to make utility measure the "distance" between a candidate and a voter on an issue. [脚注1 ：研究人员试图使公用事业衡量“距离”的候选人之间和选民的一个问题。 They average the scores for all issues to determine the expected utility value of the candidate for that voter.他们的平均得分为所有问题，以确定的预期效用价值的候选人，选民。 The candidate's averaged utility score for all voters is said to be her social utility to the electorate.候选人的平均得分为所有公用事业选民据说是她的社会效用，以赢得选民的支持。 The highest candidate scores from each election in a series of elections are averaged to find the highest average possible.得分最高的候选人从每个选举了一系列的选举均找到最高平均可能。 Then the social utility scores of winners under a voting rule are averaged and compared with the highest possible to give theorists a number for the utility of the rule's utility winners' efficiency as a percentage of the highest utility possible.那么，社会效用分数赢家根据投票规则，并与平均最高可能使一些理论家的效用规则的效用优胜者效率的百分比最高的实用成为可能。 Following RJ Weber (1977), most Researchers subtract a large number of utility points, equal to the score of a randomly selected candidate, from both the utility maximizer and the voting system's winners.下面的RJ韦伯（ 1977年） ，多数研究人员减去了大量的实用点，等于评分一个随机挑选的候选人，从效用最大化和表决制度的获奖者。 The size of each score is reduced.大小每个评分降低。 But the difference between their scores remains the same.但是他们之间的差异分数保持不变。 So the difference is now a larger percentage of a score.因此，不同的是现在的较大百分比的得分。 This exaggerates the differences between voting systems on utility efficiency.这之间的差异夸大投票系统的实用效率。 You must decide whether such exaggeration helps you see the differences or misleads your understanding of these differences.您必须决定是否这种夸张可以帮助您看到的分歧或误导您了解这些差异。 Get definitions from Merrill, Bordley, and Mueller.]获取定义美林， Bordley和穆勒。 ] [footnote 2: There are several different conceptions of "distance": linear, square root, and logarithmic (Merrill page 42, Bordley), and no standard unit to measure interpersonal utility for all types of issues. [注2 ：有几种不同的概念的“距离” ：线性，平方根，和对数（美林第42页， Bordley ） ，并没有标准的单位来衡量人际效用对所有类型的问题。 For these reasons, many people are skeptical about the meaning, comparison, and statistical manipulation of interpersonal utilities.]由于这些原因，许多人都持怀疑态度的含义，比较，并统计操纵人际关系公用事业。 ] |
Table 3. 表3 。 Utility Efficiencies 实用效率
in computer simulated elections with 5 candidates and 1000 voters.在计算机模拟的选举， 5名候选人和1000年的选民。
from Merrill, page 35美林，第35页
| Dispersion = 0.5色散= 0.5 | Dispersion = 1.0色散= 1.0 | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| C = 0.5 ç = 0.5 | C = 0.0 ç = 0.0 | C = 0.5 ç = 0.5 | C = 0.0 ç = 0.0 | ||||||
| Voting投票 system系统 | Random随机 society社会 | D=2 D = 2 | D=4 D = 4 | D=2 D = 2 | D=4 D = 4 | D=2 D = 2 | D=4 D = 4 | D=2 D = 2 | D=4 D = 4 |
| Plurality多元化 Runoff径流 Hare (IRV)黑尔（通气） Approval批准 Borda博尔达 Coombs库姆斯 Black (Con)黑（节能） | 70 70 81 81 82 82 90 90 95 95 87 87 93 93 | -1 -1 28 28 40 40 96 96 97 97 92 92 96 96 | 0 0 47 47 59 59 96 96 97 97 92 92 97 97 | 22 22 48 48 52 52 95 95 96 96 92 92 96 96 | 52 52 75 75 82 82 98 98 99 99 94 94 98 98 | 64 64 86 86 88 88 96 96 98 98 96 96 97 97 | 75 75 92 92 92 92 96 96 98 98 96 96 98 98 | 74 74 88 88 91 91 97 97 97 97 96 96 98 98 | 93 93 98 98 98 98 98 98 99 99 98 98 99 99 |
Merrill concludes his chapter on utility efficiency saying that :美林最后一章，他说，公用事业的效率： “The candidate with the maximum social utility is no more likely to be the Condorcet candidate than is the candidate selected by many if not most of the systems studied. “候选人的最大社会效用，没有更多的可能是孔候选人比选定的候选人很多如果不是大多数的系统研究。 That is to say, the Condorcet criterion and the criterion of maximizing social utility are in fact very different.这就是说，在孔的标准和准则的社会效用的最大化，其实非常不同。 Whenever the two criteria indicate different winners, the Condorcet winner would beat the utility winner in a one on one election.每当两个标准表明不同的赢家，将冠军的孔击败实用得主在一对一的选举。 The problem with all utility voting systems is that a minority of voters can claim on their ballots that their candidate has a much higher utility value for them than any other candidate.这个问题的所有实用程序表决系统，只有少数的选民可以要求其选票的候选人，他们有一个更高的实用价值，他们比其他任何候选人。 With this claim they may be able to "steal" the election from a complacent majority.与这种说法，他们或许能够“窃取”选举从自满多数。
Distribution of Winners 分布的优胜者Chamberlin and Cohen's 1978 spatial-model simulations showed Condorcet picked the candidate "nearest" the "center of the electorate" 87% of the time.张伯伦和科恩的1978年空间模型模拟显示孔挑选候选“就近”和“中心的选民” 87 ％的时间。 I think this suggests a political measure of political outcomes -- in contrast to the economic measure of utility.我认为，这意味着政治的政治成果-与此相反的经济措施的效用。 To measure the dispersions of voters and candidates and the distributions of winners and budget allocations assumes that each citizen has an equal right not only to vote but to be represented and to live under government programs compatible with the citizen's philosophy.衡量分散选民和候选人以及获奖者分布和预算拨款假设每个公民的平等权利不仅要参加表决，但派代表参加，并生活在政府项目符合公民的理念。 A system that produced proportional outcomes would reduce majority domination of minorities and so make empire building unattractive.这样的一个系统产生的结果将减少比例多数统治少数人，因此使帝国大厦吸引力。 The majority would lose some of its autonomy for every increase in territory.绝大多数人会失去一些自主权，每增加领土。 Table 4. 表4 。 Nearness to the Center of the Theoretical Electorate 贴近该中心的理论选民
Condorcet has the narrowest distribution around the center.孔已最窄分布中心。 IRV has the second widest.第二通气已广泛。 LOR's distribution of winners will depend on the percentage of elections with natural or manipulated voting cycles.耳鼻喉科的分配赢家，将取决于选举的比例与自然或操纵投票周期。 We know that natural cycles are rare in elections but they maybe common when enacting policies.我们知道，是罕见的自然周期，但在选举时，他们也许共同颁布的政策。 Perhaps Condorcet tends to elect high utility candidates because it directly compares every candidate with each of the others.也许孔往往选出高效的候选人，因为它直接比较，每名候选人的每个人。 Simulations by Bordley and Merrill both found Condorcet's rule picked winners a bit lower in utility than Borda which uses all information in one step.模拟的Bordley和美林都发现孔的规则挑选优胜者低一点的效用比博尔达使用的一切信息的一个步骤。 Condorcet certainly beats IRV which uses only first-choice information at each of several steps.孔通气这当然比只使用首选的信息在每次几个步骤。 Notice that plurality tends to elect the least-favorite candidate, the one toward one edge on a scattergram.请注意，多元化往往选出最不喜欢的候选人，一个对一个边缘的scattergram 。 That's because she has no competition for the voters in that area of the electorate.这是因为她没有竞争的选民在这个领域的选民。 Meanwhile other candidates split-up the first-choice votes from the electorate's center.同时其他候选人分裂的第一选择票的选民的中心。
You can run simulation experiments with PoliticalSim TM or just play with it enough to get a feel for the tendancies of a few major rules.您可以运行模拟实验与PoliticalSim 商标或只是发挥它足以让感受的倾向，一些主要规则。 |
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